


Routes to tour in Germany


The German Holiday Route – from the Alps to the Baltic









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


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2 Melsungen
3 Schwäbisch Hall
4 Berchtesgaden



The German Tribune

Hamburg, 31 December 1989
Twenty-eighth year - No. 1401 - By air

A WEEKLY REVIEW OF THE GERMAN PRESS

C 20725 C
ISSN 0016-8858
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Kohl, Modrow do tightrope act under difficult circumstances

The process of reform in East Germany is irreversible, East Berlin Prime Minister Hans Modrow told Chancellor Kohl at the German-German summit in Dresden. Economic reforms would be geared to market conditions. Both leaders agreed on a wide range of items. In this article for the Hamburg-based weekly, *Die Zeit*, Robert Leicht looks at the ramifications of the meeting and observes that it was a milestone on the way to closer German ties.

The German Question will be open for as long as the Brandenburg Gate is closed, Federal President Richard von Weizsäcker said some years ago, outlining the German people's historic horizon.

Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl and GDR Premier Hans Modrow agreed in Dresden to open a crossing-point at the Brandenburg Gate, a symbol of both unity and division, in time for Christmas.

What, then, about the German Question? For the Germans themselves the division of their country has now symbolically forfeited much of its severity.

A substantial number of people in both German states are now more worried about the specific consequences of their unexpected rapprochement: a sellout of the GDR and the social cost to the Federal Republic.

For their neighbours in East and West the German Question has lost none of its cutting edge even though walls may come tumbling down and gates may open.

They find it an even less congenial subject than at any time since the Second World War.

The Dresden summit meeting of the two German heads of government thus took place in the most contradictory circumstances. Exaggerated expectations of unity and ill-tempered fears of unity made the meeting a tight-rope walk for both Helmut Kohl and Hans Modrow.

In the event they did both German hopes and their neighbours' fears justice. The German "community of responsibility" has proved its worth and been more reliable than might have been expected only a while ago.

- Treaty ties between the Federal Republic and the GDR are to be established in spring. In 1973, when the Basic Treaty was ratified, Egon Bahr said: "Until now we have been on no terms whatever; now we are on bad ones." Bad neighbours are now to become good neighbours.
- The two Economic Affairs Ministers signed a cooperation agreement. The economic affairs commission, in a state

More reports on pages 3 & 5

of suspended animation on account of Berlin since Erich Honecker visited Bonn in 1987, is finally to be set up. An investment protection agreement is planned. Transport and telecom networks are improving.
- The Bonn Chancellor and the East Berlin Premier made it clear that both German states were interested in disarmament and arms control.
- Last but not least, Premier Modrow gave his word that the process of reform was irreversible in the GDR, that free elections would, above all, be held and that economic reforms were to be geared to market conditions.

That puts paid to the longstanding Bonn dispute over what must first be done before the Federal Republic can provide the GDR with aid on a large scale.

Chancellor Kohl said the Salzgitter agency [illegible] criminal offences on the intra-German border might soon be wound up. It must surely be superfluous once the rule of law applies on both sides of the border.

The intra-German chord sounded in so many ways by the two German leaders was impressive. The common keynote on all-European affairs sounded by Chancellor Kohl and Premier Modrow was arguably even more impressive.

They both made an impressive appeal for stability in Europe. Both referred to the Helsinki process and both called for a CSCE summit conference to be held next year.

The Federal Chancellor had a certain amount of ground to make good, especially after the international response to his ten-point plan, initially intended mainly for domestic consumption.



Appointment in Dresden: Chancellor Kohl (left), Bonn Minister of State Seiters (centre) and East Berlin Prime Minister Modrow. (Photo: dpa)

In Dresden a much more sensible note was sounded, more sensible even than some of the views expressed, in keeping with the moment and with popular sentiment, by a man such as Willy Brandt in Berlin.

Herr Kohl referred to the CSCE Final Act on two counts. It mentioned peaceful border changes, he said, and said they must be subject to approval by all signatories.

The Federal Republic has yet to guarantee Poland's western border beyond any shadow of doubt.

Above all, the Chancellor must now call his henchmen to order. There must be no more talk of German unity being no-one else's business, and there must be positively no mention of German unity making East Germany Nato territory.

One point that has grown steadily clearer in recent weeks is that reform in the socialist states and stability in Europe must not be allowed to clash, especially not where we are concerned.

In intra-German affairs Mikhail Gorbachov's words apply in reverse. Those who act too soon are punished by history.

Both risks must be kept at bay: that of an explosion of German desire for unity and an implosion of the GDR.

That is why, paradoxical though it may sound, those who favour not a confederation but eventual unity must do all they can to ensure the GDR's stability.

The GDR itself is at a precarious transitional stage. The old regime has been demolished and discredited, but a democratically elected government cannot assume power until the general election next May.

The election campaign, which has been under way for some time, will to begin with inevitably contribute toward further uncertainty.

Parties old and new are engaged in a quest for policies and personalities. With the best will in the world voters cannot yet have the slightest idea who they will vote for.

They may end up having to choose between the efficacy of the caretaker government and the credibility of the unblemished but inexperienced Opposition. This

Continued on page 3

Sparkling Christmas at Brandenburg Gate

The Brandenburg Gate, cut off from the West by the Wall since 1961, is now accessible from both parts of Berlin. Two pedestrian checkpoints were cut in the wall at Christmas. (Photo: Sven Simon)

IN THIS ISSUE

INTERNATIONAL

The end for the Ceausescus: a nation needs to be rebuilt

Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger

The fall of the Rumanian despot Nicolae Ceausescu and his haughty wife Elena had much in common with the way in which the ambitious couple ended up by ruling "their" state: it was inhuman and gruesome.

The fall of the tyrant and his family has been accompanied by a deep and painful trail of blood in the Balkans.

It may have been quick to take its toll of the couple who were mainly to blame, but that in no way detracts from the horror of civil war.

The Ceausescu regime had long been a disgrace to Europe. As human rights came increasingly into their own in Europe from West to East, Rumania with its relentless repression increasingly became a historic anachronism.

Ceausescu's avowed intent of crushing the uprising against his dictatorship like the aged Deng Xiaoping had crushed the student uprising in the Chinese capital testified to the true character of his regime.

Newsreel footage of the carnage that contrasted so starkly with the Christmas message also made it clear what risks the process of change in Eastern Europe has always run.

How lucky Europe East and West has been that the end of communist sole rule in Hungary and Poland and the ouster of Party leaderships in the GDR, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia have yet to be accompanied by bloodshed.

The irritation and nervousness demonstrated by Mr Gorbachov, the embattled Soviet leader hard hit by the Lithuanian Communist Party's decision to go it alone, were understandable enough in view of the confusion in Rumania.

His reform course is being subjected to severe strain that forces him to justify his every move and calls eventual success increasingly into question.

The mortgage of nearly 25 years of dictatorship the Ceausescus have bequeathed to Rumania is depressing for sure. Now the clan has been ousted economic disaster and political crisis reign, as elsewhere in Eastern Europe, plus a moral nadir in the wake of the carnage of civil war.

Rumania will be split down the middle, with a rift driven between victims and perpetrators, the persecuted and their persecutors.

The swift execution of Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu will tend to heighten the tension, which is the worst conceivable starting point for a fresh political start.

The end of the Ceausescus' tyranny makes one wonder how the clan, whose criminal behaviour grew steadily more apparent, were able to hold on to power for so long.

Ceausescu certainly consolidated his regime by resort to the slogan: "My enemy's enemy is my friend." By opposing Moscow in the 1960s he earned credit in the anti-communist West.

Yet behind this smokescreen of diplomatic going it alone he established a brutal Stalinist system at home.

The results were catastrophic. Motivated by industrial megalomania, Ceausescu embarked on building gigantic rolling mills and petrochemical plant.

He totally overestimated Rumania's domestic oil reserves, with the result that these factories were soon in ruins.

Industrialisation having been given preference, agriculture was neglected, with the result that Rumania, an erstwhile breadbasket, suffered from food shortages from the 1970s.

Rumania's short-lived economic glory was based on borrowed money. By the early 1980s Bucharest owed Western creditors $11bn.

By making his fellow-countrymen starve and freeze Ceausescu succeeded, by dint of unprecedented austerity, in repaying this debt.

Four weeks before he was ousted he was able to announce that Rumania's foreign debts had been repaid in full and ahead of time. But the cost was appalling.

Another of the fixed ideas at which the conducator set his cap was to create a "new type" of mankind.

The most salient features of this policy were the "systematisation" of villages and Ceausescu's minorities policy.

He planned to bulldoze 8,000 of the country's 13,000 traditional villages. Villagers were to be compulsorily rehoused in concrete blocks euphemistically described as agro-industrial complexes.

This was clearly intended in part as a blow at the country's ethnic minorities, especially the Hungarians and Germans. Resettlement would have broken and destroyed their respective linguistic and cultural identity.

There can be no doubt that Rumania will need to be completely rebuilt. Yet the country has no historical experience whatever of democracy; it has known only feudalism, fascism and dictatorship.

Can the new leadership gain public confidence, given that it was groomed for power during the Ceausescu era?

The new, no doubt provisional head of state, Ion Iliescu, can at least claim a cordial personal acquaintanceship with Mikhail Gorbachov; they were students together in Moscow.

That may open up new political leeway Bucharest badly needs.

Such far-reaching prospects apart, what Rumania most urgently needs is to survive the present winter.

The West neglected Rumania for far too long, leaving it to the tender mercies of its Red Dracula.

One can but hope the present wave of sympathy and readiness to lend a helping hand will not peter out in next to no time.

Rumania is too deep in the throes of crisis to succeed in starting from scratch entirely on its own.

Heinz Verfürth

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, Cologne, 27 December 1989)

A dilemma for the Vatican, breathing space for Noriega

The Vatican's views on General Noriega, the Panamanian ex-dictator wanted on drugs charges in the United States, are unequivocal.

How to handle his application for political asylum now he has sought refuge at the Papal nunciature in Panama City is another matter. A swift decision can hardly be expected.

Vatican spokesman Navarro-Valls tentativelyoutlined the Holy See's view as being that it was mainly for Panama to decide whether General Noriega was to be granted asylum or handed over to the USA.

It was then for the United States to decide, as the country demanding his extradition, and for Cuba, Nicaragua and Spain, to which he had applied for asylum.

The Church has so far offered the ex-dictator a mere breathing space. It is to be used to hold intensive talks in a bid to arrive at a solution.

What shape might a solution take now that a rerun of the decades spent by Cardinal Mindszenty in the US embassy in Budapest has been ruled out?

The Vatican's indecision is less marked than is generally felt to be the case. It is a difficult one, but the Vatican is basking in the reputation it has gained in the wake of its successful Ostpolitik.

Time can be taken until the waves of anger subside and have given way to more level-headed legal considerations. There can certainly be no question of handing the General over to the United States.

There is no extradition agreement between Panama and the USA or between the USA and the Vatican.

It would have been more difficult to refuse a request by the new Panamanian government, but what guarantees that the general would be done no physical harm might have sufficed to underpin the Holy See's international reputation as a protecting power?

For the nunciature and the Vatican there can be no doubt which higher legal precept must prevail. The refugee's right must be given priority over legal proceedings.

This being so, the Vatican is using all the diplomatic channels at its disposal to ensure that this principle is heeded.

Spain has declined, preferring to have nothing whatever to do with a politician reputed to be a drug runner, but other countries might well be prepared to offer General Noriega asylum as an anti-US symbol.

Washington can be sure to try and thwart any such attempts. The Holy See will seek a magic formula by which to divest itself of its unwelcome guest without abandoning the principle mentioned above.

Wolfgang Salle

(Rheinische Post, Düsseldorf, 27 December 1989)

1989, the year of the Central European revolution

Never have so many authoritarian regimes been ousted in one year in post-war Europe. In 1945 it was an external process of liberation, with the Third Reich ending in military defeat in a disastrous world war.

Democracy only survived in part of the Continent, which did not succeed in divesting itself of the Spanish and Portuguese dictators for a further 30 years and saw Greece temporarily revert to the colonels' rule in the meantime.

The Central European revolution of 1989, coming exactly 200 years after the French Revolution, the first triumph of bourgeois democracy in continental Europe, was the work of the people.

That hasn't often been the case in modern European history and can only be compared with 1789 and 1917-19, having exceeded even the popular groundswell of 1848.

The 1848 revolutionary movement did not everywhere, let alone lastingly, establish popular rule.

In France it was followed by centralised Imperial rule. In other countries the Holy Alliance and Metternich's restoration prevailed.

In the aftermath of 1848 princely leagues, the Hohenzollerns and the Habsburgs regained control.

It took the bourgeois age two world wars, both started by Germany, to develop into a democratic era, partly as a result of the division of Europe in 1945. The antithesis of one-party rule was bound to demonstrate its legitimate claim to democratic power. It took the integration of democratic-socialist movements in society to bring about the permanent process of reform that is the keynote of Western Europe.

It was a deliberate process, guaranteeing safety from revolutionary change in the West, where classical capitalism underwent democratic and detailed changes.

The historic compromise between the working class movement and the powers that be is probably the most crucial feature of the new approach in Europe.

It is an approach that has yet to be taken to its conclusion. It still needs further lasting reforms and greater social justice.

They must make the institutions that safeguard and develop what has been accomplished to date progressively more perfect, sharing power as they have done.

They must find even better means of coping with social and economic crises.

The "West" must not lay sole claim to its prosperity. It must share it with the second and third worlds, and not just with their Westernised elites.

The other half of Europe must also take part in the process of technical and scientific innovation.

Eastern Central Europe, which has freed itself, can provide major stimuli, stimuli as different as the roads to freedom have been.

In the western republics of the Soviet Union democratic trends are partly emerging from what, so far, has been the sole ruling party.

In Hungary a reformist communist party forged ahead with change to the point of abandoning its very identity.

In Poland a non-partisan workers' movement has superseded the old system with the backing of the Church.

In the GDR and Czechoslovakia short-term transitional forces broke the back of the old system under the constant pressure of mass movements and mass migration.

In other respects the changes in the GDR and Czechoslovakia have had little in common.

Ceausescu's dictatorship was last to go, having finally threatened to annihilate the Rumanian people.

Ceausescu's regime was the only one in Eastern Central Europe to be ousted

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The German Tribune
Friedrich Reinecke Verlag GmbH, 3-4 Hartwicusstrasse, D-2000 Hamburg 76, Tel.: 22850 Telex: 02-14733.
Editor-in-chief: Otto Heinz. Editor: Alexander Anthony. English language sub-editor: Simon Burnett. – Distribution manager: Georgine Picone.
Published weekly with the exception of the second week in January, the second week in April, the third week in September and the third week in November.
Advertising rates list No. 16
Annual subscription DM 45
Printed by CW Niemeyer-Druck, Hameln
Distributed in the USA by: MASS MAILINGS, Inc., 540 West 24th Street, New York, N.Y. 10011.
Postmaster: send change of address to The German Tribune ℅ MASS MAILINGS.
Articles in THE GERMAN TRIBUNE are translated from the original text and published by agreement with leading newspapers in the Federal Republic of Germany.
In all correspondence please quote your subscription number which appears on the wrapper, between asterisks, above your address.

GERMANY

Meeting in Dresden sets the tone for new relationship

At their Dresden summit Helmut Kohl and Hans Modrow achieved much more than opening the Brandenburg Gate before Christmas, having visa and compulsory exchange requirements for visitors to the GDR from the Federal Republic and West Berlin dropped a week ahead of schedule and agreeing to free all political detainees in the GDR as soon as possible.

They were widely agreed, not only on Herr Kohl's endorsement of stabilisation in the GDR but on Herr Modrow's readiness to abide by the right of national self-determination and all the other principles laid down in the CSCE Final Act, and in particular to be "exemplary on human rights."

On the basis of this agreement they took in Dresden the first steps toward a treaty relationship between the two German states.

They agreed that economic affairs were a "central feature of the treaty relationship" and further agreed that "a fundamental change in economic policy and an economic reform geared to market conditions" was what they had in mind.

That can only mean a decision, barely papered over, to give priority to the market rather than to economic planning in the GDR.

On this basis Chancellor Kohl and Premier Modrow arrived at a wide range of agreements. They agreed, for instance, to set up 11 commissions and working parties.

While an agreement on the proposed treaty relationship must wait until the GDR has a freely elected government, work can go ahead here and now on breathing life into the relationship.

The commissions and working parties set up in Dresden will deal with the following:

— the intensification of economic cooperation,

— extension of tourism,

— environmental protection,

— radiation protection and reactor safety,

— extensions to the telephone and telecom network in the GDR,

— legal assistance and legal protection,

— coordination of the work of regional committees, to be set up by local authorities on both sides of the intra-German border to handle joint tasks,

— the extension and intensification of cultural cooperation,

— problems that arise in connection with the reciprocal exchange of newspapers and magazines and the broadcasting of radio and TV programmes.

When these commissions and working parties get down to work in the New Year they will find that a number of important criteria were laid down at the Dresden summit.

The GDR government has, for instance, decided to permit direct contacts between West German firms and GDR combines and works, including freedom of choice of representatives.

GDR combines and works are also to be given foreign trade powers so they can act more independently.

The GDR has also said it plans as soon as possible to establish a legal basis for joint ventures and direct investment.

Negotiations on an investment protection treaty are to begin. The Federal government has promised further funds to promote economic cooperation between companies.

It will also be increasing the guaranteed framework within which goods can be supplied to the GDR, and both sides have agreed to strengthen private enterprise in the GDR.

The following sectors were identified as "fields for particularly intensive cooperation": energy, measurement and control engineering, product automation, trade and marketing, standardisation and quality control, and commercial legal safeguards.

In environmental protection the pilot projects already agreed are to be completed soon and an "ecological plan of action" drawn up.

Telecom evidently enjoys priority. The lump sum in lieu of postal services rendered by the GDR, totalling DM200m in 1989 and due to expire in 1990, is to be increased to DM300m a year from next year. The GDR will put these funds to immediate use to modernise its postal and telecom infrastructure.

The two governments were unable to freely negotiate civil aviation terms because important rights are still controlled by the Four Powers.

They include control of Berlin air space, of the three air corridors to and from Berlin and of the air identification zone along the intra-German border, in which flight movements are subject to British and US permission.

So Herr Kohl and Herr Modrow simply agreed to hold talks on aviation matters. They are to include arrangements to fly to and from Tegel airport, West Berlin, other than via the air corridors.

Negotiations, as opposed to talks, were agreed on passenger shipping on inland waterways, meaning the Elbe, which marks the border between the two German states for several hundred miles, and on road safety.

Agreements are also planned on mutual assistance in the event of catastrophes and on police cooperation, especially in fighting drug offences and in clearing up or preventing serious criminal offences.

These negotiations are to begin either "soon" or "in the near future."

The two heads of government further agreed to permit the sale and purchase of newspapers and magazines and to promote the broadcasting of radio and TV programmes.

That presents the *Frankfurter Allgemeine* with an opportunity of being what it has set out to be since its first issue, in November 1949: a *Zeitung für Deutschland*, or Newspaper for Germany.

Karl Feldmeyer

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 21 December 1989)

Why Mitterrand hurried along to East Berlin

The East Berlin government, viewed by many as a mere caretaker government pending next May's general election, can hardly complain of international neglect.

GDR Premier Hans Modrow first met with Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl in Dresden, marking a start on the road to intra-German treaty ties.

Then President Mitterrand of France paid East Berlin his inaugural visit. He was the first Western head of government to upgrade the GDR in this way.

This flurry of visits is not the result of shrewd invitations made by East Berlin. Bonn and Paris, neighbours and allies, nearly trod on each other's toes in their bids to be the first to get a foot in the door of the former SED state.

President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl, who cut short his tour of Hungary to visit Dresden, had different and to some extent diametrically opposed motives.

Chancellor Kohl wanted to help Germans in the GDR and to pave the way for structures of coexistence and possible subsequent unity.

Mitterrand went above all out of fear that the speed of German rapprochement would reduce France's economic and political status.

Is that the reason why septuagenarian M. Mitterrand is at present one of the world's most active statesmen? Within 10 days he met Mikhail Gorbachov, George Bush and Hans Modrow.

It would be too simple to see him as taking care to ensure that Helmut Kohl does not overstep the intra-German mark. But he would doubtless like to slow Herr Kohl down a little, by extensive diplomatic travels if need be.

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, Cologne, 22 December 1989)

Western Europe's deeds have trouble footing it with the words

If any further indication that the new situation in Germany has put Western Europe out of joint were needed, it has been clearly provided by the dispute over the Schengen Agreement.

The aim of throwing the borders of the five signatory states — France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Benelux states — wide open has been thwarted by the opening of the intra-German border.

Bonn is worried lest the border agreement with France and the Benelux states might lead to it having to build a wall of its own between the Federal Republic and the GDR.

That would be the case if, as envisaged by the terms of the Schengen Agreement, Germans from the GDR, East Europeans and citizens of other countries had to be checked and were required to hold visas for Western Europe on the intra-German border. Bonn's Western partners are worried that an open intra-German border could land them, via the Federal Republic, with an influx of foreign nationals in search of work and make the GDR a tacit 13th European Community member-state.

France's bid to blame Bonn is unsatisfactory. France must realise that the solution to this European problem cannot be to seal off the GDR border.

Could it be that the GDR argument is a convenient pretext for diverting attention from other open border problems such as drugs and terrorism?

Europe has been seen to trail woefully behind its fine words. Everyone says the European Community ought to provide the link for changes in Germany, yet a hue and-cry arises the moment the prospect of Germans from the GDR arises!

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, Cologne, 16 December 1989)

The tightrope act

Continued from page 1

is a contradiction to which, given conditions in the GDR right now, there is no solution.

The Modrow government is engaged in a race against time. It is not just a matter of its days being numbered. The nearer the election deadline, the more readily apparent it is how hollow its mandate rings.

There are clear indications already that the machinery of government is slowing down. Legal rulings go disregarded, the administration is dragging its feet, unpopular reform measures are being left, wherever possible, to the next government and civil servants are hedging on proposals. What, after all, might the next government expect of them?

Power in the GDR reminds one of a hermit crab that has left a shell that has grown too small for it and is now, mortally vulnerable, engaged in a quest for a new shell.

When this is borne in mind one cannot but be alarmed at the way in which West German parties are making use of the democratisation process in the GDR.

The new parties unquestionably need a helping hand, as do the parties of old that have been quick to part company with the old system now it is no longer able to supply the fleshpots on which they fed for decades.

As competition builds up and election day, 6 May, draws closer, reliance on Western support has almost reached the stage at which it would be true to say that a party in the GDR that has yet to find a powerful sponsor in the Federal Republic need hardly bother to stand for election.

This helping hand can become a burden. It is already clear that many West German politicians who visit the GDR are interested less in democracy in the other German state than in the run-up to next year's general election in the Federal Republic.

Having your photo taken in Leipzig is at present much more prestigious than kissing babies in the Ruhr. Once Bonn politicians start to take up cudgels against each other in GDR the process of clarification will be in serious danger of total deformation.

Yet maybe this is merely an indication of the extent to which ties between the two German states have already developed beneath the surface.

Political and economic constraints, not to mention the social divide, are arguably heading first toward coordination, then toward a convergence of systems in the light of which, with the passage of time, the question of one or two German states will grow increasingly hypothetical.

Those who listened closely to what Premier Modrow had to say in Dresden cannot have failed to gain the impression that he too may have similar ideas in mind.

Treaty ties must first be established, he said. Then, in two to three years, the two governments could discuss further moves.

He chose not to suggest what form intra-German self-determination might take in a European house without prompting feelings of anxiety and being threatened.

Willy Brandt's meeting with Willi Stoph in Erfurt 19 years ago was a tough start, encumbered by the past. Helmut Kohl's meeting with Hans Modrow in Dresden was a milestone en route to closer German ties in future.

Robert Leicht

(Die Zeit, Hamburg, 22 December 1989)

SPD CONGRESS

Lafontaine emerges as probable candidate for chancellor

The SPD has a new political manifesto; most delegates at the party congress in Berlin also believe that, a year before the general election, they also have a chancellor candidate: Oskar Lafontaine.

Although the discussion and adoption of the new manifesto was the real reason for the congress, more people were interested in the question of who would lead the Social Democrats in the election.

This explains why the answer to this question and the definition of the SPD's future Deutschlandpolitik turned out to be the main issues. The party manifesto was pushed into the background.

The pragmatic forces in the party will not regret this. They know the significance of the manifesto but they also know that public has no great interest in a lengthy list of party programme statements.

Delegates also had to accept that the upheavals in the GDR and the meeting between the two German government leaders in Dresden had stolen the show.

The significance of all considerations articulated by the Social Democrats with respect to the future policy course was degraded to that of hardly noticed statements.

No-one expected more controversial discussions anyway. They took place before the party congress.

All that was needed was a summarising and interpretive speech as a kind of guideline for the delegates for the line of argumentation with political opponents.

It was hoped that this would give the party more publicity despite greater and more important events.

This speech was given by Oskar Lafontaine. Together with Willy Brandt's speech it was the second highlight of the party congress.

Lafontaine seized the opportunity to both satisfy the demands of the delegates for fundamental and comprehensible statements as well as to promote his candidature. With the instinct of a power-conscious politician he realised that it was now or never.

Today, there can be no doubt about the fact that Lafontaine will be selected as candidate next year, provided he passes the test during the state election in Saarland in January.

Apart from this uncertainty there are two other unanswered questions: will Lafontaine's generally accepted claim to leadership bring an end to the ambiguity of the SPD leadership and does Lafontaine have enough candidate appeal to oust Helmut Kohl from the Chancellor's seat?

Lafontaine's supporters are convinced that their favourite will pass the January test with flying colours and retain his absolute majority.

Such an election victory should enable him to play a dominant role in the party without being party chairman.

As regards the general election there is no sign of anyone else who could muster a similarly widespread voter appeal. This may but need not be correct.

Party chairman Hans-Jochen Vogel allegedly dropped any idea of running as candidate for chancellor some time ago. He is also reputed to have told Lafontaine.

Apart from loyalty, however, the head of the party and of the Bundestag parliamentary group would have to demonstrate forebearance and even subordination not to push his own position and rectify a number of errors made by his deputy.

Nimble-minded as he is, and populistic in his line or argument, Lafontaine will repeatedly provide cause for conflict.

His obstinacy became obvious when he voiced his views on Deutschlandpolitik following the speech by Willy Brandt.

Whereas Brandt set his sights on German unity Lafontaine concentrated on the material well-being of the Germans in the GDR; in his opinion the organisational form of the resultant state(s) is secondary.



Looking forwards in Berlin. From left, Johannes Rau, Hans-Jochen Vogel, Oskar Lafontaine. (Photo: Werek)

Lafontaine is thirty years younger than Brandt. The latter is marked by the experience of division and separation, the other grew up with dual statehood.

Brandt would love to see that which belongs together come together, whereas Lafontaine has faith in the gradual overcoming of all borders in Europe.

Lafontaine modified the line or argument presented by his political foster-father, apparently unconcerned that there was yet again reference to the lack of clarity in the field of Deutschlandpolitik at a time when clarity prevails.

This example demonstrates that a new generation is taking control in the SPD.

Without breaking with Social Democratic tradition it is in the process of elaborating a new definition of the concept of "democratic socialism."

Its key feature is its emphasis of individual freedom, which must be achieved in all areas of life. This fits in with a development which is taking place in the modern industrial society.

This reorientation, however, is also extremely important with respect to the radical upheavals in the GDR and Eastern Europe.

Dietrich Möller

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 21 December 1989)

Brandt gets party to sort out an East Berlin policy

The collapse of the former Socialist Unity Party (SED) regime in East Germany caught the SPD napping. Following days of inertia in which the party followed the rapid development in Eastern Europe as if it was paralysed, its policy is beginning to regain its contours.

Social Democrats waited hesitantly for too long, unsure whether to jump onto the German unity bandwagon or not. Now they have decided to jumped on. One man deserves the credit: Willy Brandt.

During the party congress in Berlin the honorary chairman of the SPD reminded the party that the right of self-determination and to unity to freedom, as demanded by the Basic Law, is more important than all the diplomatic niceties, which the SPD also employed in its dialogue with Erich Honecker's ideologues.

What was the value of this "discussion culture" fostered with representatives of the "real existing socialism" responsible for the suppression of social democracy in what was then still the eastern zone?

Is this matter only closed because, as the SPD's national business-manager put it, the SED is "shattered"?

The SPD finds it difficult to admit its own mistakes and concede that it has paid dearly in this field. Its reaction to criticism is still disgruntled.

Suspicions remain that those in the SPD will change their minds who hoped up to now that the model of a democratic socialism could assert itself in the GDR.

Either they now hold their tongues or have been put in their place by Oskar Lafontaine. These cracks in credibility, the contradictoriness and the conflicting feelings are now covered up by a mood of new awakening.

Like no other, Willy Brandt symbolises the reconciliation and communication with the East.

With Brandt at the fore the SPD now spearheads a movement towards which it initially had reservations.

The dilemma of which candidate should lead the party into the election campaign year 1990 thus disappears.

How long the SPD can capitalise on this asset depends on the German-German development. No-one can predict its momentum.

For the time being, however, the SPD can fill its personnel vacuum with the "Chancellor substitute" Brandt.

Michael Schröder

(Mannheimer Morgen, 19 December 1989)

Coming to terms with changing demands of society

In the almost 130-year-old history of German social democracy, the Berlin Manifesto is the seventh fundamental definition of political position.

Clearly showing the hand of Oskar Lafontaine, it retains the basic cornerstones of the Godesberg Programme adopted in 1959, which made it possible for the SPD to open itself to the political centre (by dropping its Marxist ballast).

The basis is democratic socialism, and the pillars are the orientation to the fundamental values of freedom, justice and solidarity, the affirmation of law, of the social state and of national defence.

The new manifesto also deals with the far-reaching changes during the past 30 years and tries to resolve the conflict between the constraints of industry, technology, science and state administration on the one hand and the dignity, justice and liberty of individuals on the other.

This also includes the conflict between the economic principle and the inherent laws of nature.

Party leader Hans-Jochen Vogel explained this: "We no longer rate progress according to the criteria of 'more and more', 'bigger and bigger' and 'faster and faster', but in line with the criteria of 'better', 'more just' and 'more important.'"

This indicates that the Social Democrats favour progress which is aimed at a higher quality of life, progress which combines freedom and prosperity with the preservation of the environment.

The party's conceptual pioneer, Oskar Lafontaine, goes further. He detaches himself from nation-state frontiers and envisions a "world society" with an SPD which views itself as an "internationalist party."

The preservation of the natural foundations of life, the aversion of the threat of a climatic catastrophe, the termination of the arms race and the creation of a more just international order between poor and rich countries are tasks which can only be resolved worldwide.

The central points of the Berlin Programme are:

- *The Economy:* The state must provide an overall framework for economic development.

The economy and the environment must be dovetailed and controlled by society in accordance with social and ecological aspects. This includes a comprehensive democratisation of the economy a greater say of workers (codetermination), greater worker participation in productive assets, more informative dialogues with citizens before important decisions and the incorporation of plebiscitary elements (referenda) in the constitution.

Enviromentally harmful activity should be punished more rigorously and energy-saving promoted through financial incentives.

The aim of pulling out of nuclear energy was confirmed. A major goal is the 30-hour working week and a six-hour working day.

Saturdays should not be classed as regular working days, working on Sundays should only be allowed in urgent cases; and night work should be an exception.

- *Social Policy:* The SPD calls for a basic income minimum to supplement the contribution- and output-related protection system and safeguard the needs of the elderly, the sick and the unemployed.
- *Deutschlandpolitik:* The SPD works towards a community of responsibility for the Germans in order to formulate the joint interests of the two German states in disarmament, detente and cooperation.

The Germans have a right to self-détermination, but the question of the German nation remains subordinate to the requirements of peace.

Wilm Herlyn

(Rheinische Post, Düsseldorf, 21 December 1989)

PERSPECTIVE

On the threshold of a new start – what reunification is likely to signify

Wolfgang Schuller is Professor of Ancient History at the University of Constance. The following article is the text of a lecture the author gave to the *Deutschlandpolitischer Arbeitskreis* in Constance.

German reunification is unmistakably on the agenda. Any claim to the contrary in conjunction with a reference to purported realities which stand in its way overlooks the fact that realities which were regarded as unalterable up until only a short while ago no longer exist.

Topics are now being discussed which were previously taboo or irrelevant.

Admittedly, many people would prefer not to see the item of reunification on the agenda.

The following article takes a critical look at this view and maintains that we are already in the middle of a process of reunification,

For the first time since 1945 all Germans again stand on the threshold of a new start.

This time, however, they can shape their destiny themselves and, as opposed to the situation immediately after the war, the prospects are better than ever before.

Paradoxically, there is an atmosphere of general uncertainty and confusion. Some countries in the West even seem to be at a loss for an appropriate response.

This is due to the fact that the coordinates of political life so far have shifted overnight and that no-one was prepared for this development.

Ever since the reforms born of necessity in the Soviet Union, and in the case of the GDR since the spring of this year at the latest, anyone with a nose for political developments realised that sudden changes were imminent. Political leaders should have made preparations accordingly. Instead, the dead-end situation in the German Question was expected to continue — a case of incomprehensible blindness.

Communism is now collapsing, and since it was Communism which caused the division of Germany the question of its elimination immediately arises.

Yet there is opposition to such a goal. As long as reunification seemed like a pipe-dream it was easy enough to pay lip-service to its realisation. Now this cover it being dropped.

To a certain extent the misgivings abroad are of a serious nature; there are fears of a disruption of the balance of power equilibrium.

Often, however, reactions reflect a pure and simple hostility to Germans and warnings of a German predominance.

All in all, it is easy enough to get over this reaction. Democracy is making such great progress in the whole of Europe that there can be no serious objection to the desire of the German people to live together in one state.

All the worrying is unfounded. A united Germany will exist in a united Europe. (It is worth mentioning that two Germanies would have two votes and thus greater influence in various committees, etc.).

Opinion surveys abroad point in this direction. Impressive TV interviews in the streets of Moscow showed how ordinary people feel about German unity. All those interviewed stated that German unity is something which is bound to come.

In such a situation it is typical for our national character that we Germans ourselves are articulating and thus increasing the reservations expressed abroad.

First of all, this is noticeable among liberal-conservatives. Although there is no clear opposition to German unity in nevertheless exists.

It is rooted in the desire to be left in peace and be allowed to earn more money. These people do not want all the effort, sacrifices and irritations associated with all the problems which come to Germany from the GDR.

Most people in this category have come to terms with the status quo, are well-off, support greater integration in the West and do not want to be bothered by the problems facing the GDR.

There were signs of this approach during the last congress of the Baden-Württemberg CDU. The ideas formulated by Baden-Württemberg Premier Lothar Späth (CDU) on the recognition of a GDR citizenship probably move in the same direction.

Left-wing opposition to a united Germany is much clearer and articulated in more concrete terms.

The following loyal address sent by the General Student Committee (AstA) of the Free University of Berlin to the architect of the Berlin Wall, Erich Honecker, on the occasion of the GDR's fortieth anniversary shows that even the most serious matter has an amusing side to it:

"The AstA of the Free University of West Berlin congratulates the GDR on the celebration of forty years of its existence.

"Under extremely difficult conditions the GDR was founded as a socialist and anti-fascist state in 1949.

"As opposed to the FRG it thus broke fascist continuity in industry, the judiciary and the state.

"At present the GDR is again being subjected to fierce attacks by western media.

"Communism caused the division of Germany ....and now communism is collapsing"

"We dissociate ourselves from the attempts by the FRG to thus legitimate itself as a democratic state and distract attention from its own imperialist policy towards victims of persecution in the Third World.

"People who are leaving the GDR for various reasons are being misused as a manoeuvrable mass and, above all, played off against foreign workers.

"The Asta protests against the attempt by the ruling class in the FRG and West Berlin to use the emigrants from the GDR as an argument to force the GDR to introduce reforms of a capitalist nature.

"The further development of socialism in the GDR is a matter for the Communists and Socialists inside and outside of the Party to decide for themselves.

"Long live international solidarity. With combative greetings, The General Student Committee of the FU West Berlin."

In the light of developments in the GDR this is indeed amusing. Perhaps the SED will give the authors of this address a small residence in Wandlitz; there are plenty of rooms free there now.

Perhaps more relevant in this context are the almost manic anti-unity emotions demonstrated by the Greens, a kind of home-made Germanophobia. Not all Greens think this way, but many of their more prominent members.

The division of Germany in itself is viewed as worth retaining. Why?

Partly because of enthusiasm for socialism, an aspect which will be dealt with in greater detail a little later on, and partly because of a German feeling of guilt and remorse, jumbled up with confused historical elements.

The harmless unification of the GDR and the Federal Republic of Germany is denounced as "Pan-German." This, too, is really amusing.

I hope that the West German Social Democrats will forgive me for dealing with them next.

There are still some in its ranks who strictly advocate dual statehood and who still use the word "socialism" in this context.

Apparently, the demand to delete the preamble of the Basic Law has been forgotten, even though there are still considerations tending towards two German citizenships.

Some Social Democrats, however, find it difficult to move away from the affinity to the dictatorial Communist Party in the [illegible]

Admittedly, a large part of the SPD viewed this proximity as a means to an end.

Outwardly, however, it looked like heartiness without strings. The dissidents' magazine *Grenzfall* even went so far as to claim that Oskar Lafontaine had behaved no better than a "glorified Honecker."

And why did the chairman of the SPD in Berlin, Walter Momper, reject the new foundation of the Social Democrats in the GDR?

Why did he give an interview on 18 November to the "organ of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany", *Neues Deutschland*, following which the newspaper was quite rightly able to emphasise that he had "stressed agreement between the SED and the SPD over several issues."?

Why does Momper talk of the "people of the GDR"? Is he familiar with a "people of the Federal Republic of Germany"? Or of West Berlin?

It is highly embarrassing that of all people politicians from a party which has fought in the front line for human rights and national unity now tries to maintain its obscure alliance with the notorious enemies of such efforts. However, here too, history will simply take its course and ignore this development.

The word "socialism" plays a particularly important role in this context. Its democratic significance and its achievements should be retained.

In a television discussion in Leipzig a representative of the SDP, Kamilli, quite rightly said that a sober assessment must now be made of these achievements to see what can stand up in reality.

As regards the definition of socialism there are as many variants as there are people who advocate them.

The socialism which ruled in the GDR ruined its part of Germany because of sheer incompetence — do people want to take up this tradition? Furthermore, any desire to let this system continue would mean continuing on the basis of a Stalinist system which was violently and bloodily introduced. Surely no-one wants to benefit from Stalin's NKWD?

Is this peculiarly German? There is something touchingly gullible about the way in which German intellectuals in East and West go into raptures about the ideals of socialism.

The Czechoslovakian Opposition is more advanced, let us say more enlightened, in this respect.

This, however, is by no means representative of the entire SPD. There is probably a majority of members who call for democracy with the consequences of the unification of the German people in one state with no ifs and buts.

Willy Brandt is one such Social Democrat, a man who has rediscovered his true self thanks to the events which are now taking place and who has again become the most rousing figure in West German politics.

What the population of the GDR itself thinks and wants is another matter altogether.

It is terrible to see how rapidly empty phrases are again produced. People should be "level-headed," we are told, the GDR should not be "patronised."

"The socialism of East Germany ruined the country because of sheer incompetence"

This is not the main problem. No-one is against level-headedness and the warning against patronisation is simply a convenient excuse for those who want to preserve the GDR.

No-one knows better than we do what the self-esteem of the GDR population is like. During the past decades we have maintained links in a situation which seemed hopeless.

43 years of isolation are bound to have lasting effects. We spoilt Westerners find it possible to really understand what the people in the GDR have endured in silence.

The fact that the East Germans have liberated themselves, even if the initial spark came from those who fled and a tail wind blew from the East and, to a lesser extent, from the West, also contributes towards the formation of an independent and proud self-esteem.

Those who have fought for freedom and unity in the West for decades certainly have no intention of crudely and clumsily telling those who have suffered a much harder fate what they should do.

Some people in the West who demand restraint have completely different plans. This explains the prohibitory tone.

Sometimes the impression is gained that it would be better if Germans were not allowed to even argue in favour of reunification.

Secondly, most of the recommendations made are anything but unwelcome. On the contrary, many East Germans turn to us for advice — from the general secretary of the SED to the previously unpolitical persons who are taking their first steps in the emerging Opposition groups.

Not to give advice in this situation would be tantamount to supporting the SED.

Thirdly, it is understandable that a people which has been exploited since 1946 and is in the process of liberating itself feels that other things are more important to begin with than speedy unifica-

Continued on page 6

SPD CONGRESS

Lafontaine emerges as probable candidate for chancellor

The SPD has a new political manifesto; most delegates at the party congress in Berlin also believe that, a year before the general election, they also have a chancellor candidate: Oskar Lafontaine.

Although the discussion and adoption of the new manifesto was the real reason for the congress, more people were interested in the question of who would lead the Social Democrats in the election.

This explains why the answer to this question and the definition of the SPD's future Deutschlandpolitik turned out to be the main issues. The party manifesto was pushed into the background.

The pragmatic forces in the party will not regret this. They know the significance of the manifesto but they also know that public has no great interest in a lengthy list of party programme statements.

Delegates also had to accept that the upheavals in the GDR and the meeting between the two German government leaders in Dresden had stolen the show.

The significance of all considerations articulated by the Social Democrats with respect to the future policy course was degraded to that of hardly noticed statements.

No-one expected more controversial discussions anyway. They took place before the party congress.

All that was needed was a summarising and interpretive speech as a kind of guideline for the delegates for the line of argumentation with political opponents.

It was hoped that this would give the party more publicity despite greater and more important events.

This speech was given by Oskar Lafontaine. Together with Willy Brandt's speech it was the second highlight of the party congress.

Lafontaine seized the opportunity to both satisfy the demands of the delegates for fundamental and comprehensible statements as well as to promote his candidature. With the instinct of a power-conscious politician he realised that it was now or never.

Today, there can be no doubt about the fact that Lafontaine will be selected as candidate next year, provided he passes the test during the state election in Saarland in January.

Apart from this uncertainty there are two other unanswered questions: will Lafontaine's generally accepted claim to leadership bring an end to the ambiguity of the SPD leadership and does Lafontaine have enough candidate appeal to oust Helmut Kohl from the Chancellor's seat?

Lafontaine's supporters are convinced that their favourite will pass the January test with flying colours and retain his absolute majority.

Such an election victory should enable him to play a dominant role in the party without being party chairman.

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Apart from loyalty, however, the head of the party and of the Bundestag parliamentary group would have to demonstrate forebearance and even subordination not to push his own position and rectify a number of errors made by his deputy.

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Looking forwards in Berlin. From left, Johannes Rau, Hans-Jochen Vogel, Oskar Lafontaine. (Photo: Werek)

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Dietrich Möller

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The dilemma of which candidate should lead the party into the election campaign year 1990 thus disappears.

How long the SPD can capitalise on this asset depends on the German-German development. No-one can predict its momentum.

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Michael Schröder

(Mannheimer Morgen, 19 December 1989)

Coming to terms with changing demands of society

In the almost 130-year-old history of German social democracy, the Berlin Manifesto is the seventh fundamental definition of political position.

Clearly showing the hand of Oskar Lafontaine, it retains the basic cornerstones of the Godesberg Programme adopted in 1959, which made it possible for the SPD to open itself to the political centre (by dropping its Marxist ballast).

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Wilm Herlyn

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PERSPECTIVE

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This is due to the fact that the coordinates of political life so far have shifted overnight and that no-one was prepared for this development.

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Yet there is opposition to such a goal. As long as reunification seemed like a pipe-dream it was easy enough to pay lip-service to its realisation. Now this cover it being dropped.

To a certain extent the misgivings abroad are of a serious nature; there are fears of a disruption of the balance of power equilibrium.

Often, however, reactions reflect a pure and simple hostility to Germans and warnings of a German predominance.

All in all, it is easy enough to get over this reaction. Democracy is making such great progress in the whole of Europe that there can be no serious objection to the desire of the German people to live together in one state.

All the worrying is unfounded. A united Germany will exist in a united Europe. (It is worth mentioning that two Germanies would have two votes and thus greater influence in various committees, etc.).

Opinion surveys abroad point in this direction. Impressive TV interviews in the streets of Moscow showed how ordinary people feel about German unity. All those interviewed stated that German unity is something which is bound to come.

In such a situation it is typical for our national character that we Germans ourselves are articulating and thus increasing the reservations expressed abroad.

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Partly because of enthusiasm for socialism, an aspect which will be dealt with in greater detail a little later on, and partly because of a German feeling of guilt and remorse, jumbled up with confused historical elements.

The harmless unification of the GDR and the Federal Republic of Germany is denounced as "Pan-German." This, too, is really amusing.

I hope that the West German Social Democrats will forgive me for dealing with them next.

There are still some in its ranks who strictly advocate dual statehood and who still use the word "socialism" in this context.

Apparently, the demand to delete the preamble of the Basic Law has been forgotten, even though there are still considerations tending towards two German citizenships.

Some Social Democrats, however, find it difficult to move away from the affinity to the dictatorial Communist Party in the [illegible]

Admittedly, a large part of the SPD viewed this proximity as a means to an end.

Outwardly, however, it looked like heartiness without strings. The dissidents' magazine *Grenzfall* even went so far as to claim that Oskar Lafontaine had behaved no better than a "glorified Honecker."

And why did the chairman of the SPD in Berlin, Walter Momper, reject the new foundation of the Social Democrats in the GDR?

Why did he give an interview on 18 November to the "organ of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany", *Neues Deutschland*, following which the newspaper was quite rightly able to emphasise that he had "stressed agreement between the SED and the SPD over several issues."?

Why does Momper talk of the "people of the GDR"? Is he familiar with a "people of the Federal Republic of Germany"? Or of West Berlin?

It is highly embarrassing that of all people politicians from a party which has fought in the front line for human rights and national unity now tries to maintain its obscure alliance with the notorious enemies of such efforts. However, here too, history will simply take its course and ignore this development.

The word "socialism" plays a particularly important role in this context. Its democratic significance and its achievements should be retained.

In a television discussion in Leipzig a representative of the SDP, Kamilli, quite rightly said that a sober assessment must now be made of these achievements to see what can stand up in reality.

As regards the definition of socialism there are as many variants as there are people who advocate them.

The socialism which ruled in the GDR ruined its part of Germany because of sheer incompetence — do people want to take up this tradition? Furthermore, any desire to let this system continue would mean continuing on the basis of a Stalinist system which was violently and bloodily introduced. Surely no-one wants to benefit from Stalin's NKWD?

Is this peculiarly German? There is something touchingly gullible about the way in which German intellectuals in East and West go into raptures about the ideals of socialism.

The Czechoslovakian Opposition is more advanced, let us say more enlightened, in this respect.

This, however, is by no means representative of the entire SPD. There is probably a majority of members who call for democracy with the consequences of the unification of the German people in one state with no ifs and buts.

Willy Brandt is one such Social Democrat, a man who has rediscovered his true self thanks to the events which are now taking place and who has again become the most rousing figure in West German politics.

What the population of the GDR itself thinks and wants is another matter altogether.

It is terrible to see how rapidly empty phrases are again produced. People should be "level-headed," we are told, the GDR should not be "patronised."

❛The socialism of East Germany ruined the country because of sheer incompetence❜

This is not the main problem. No-one is against level-headedness and the warning against patronisation is simply a convenient excuse for those who want to preserve the GDR.

No-one knows better than we do what the self-esteem of the GDR population is like. During the past decades we have maintained links in a situation which seemed hopeless.

43 years of isolation are bound to have lasting effects. We spoilt Westerners find it possible to really understand what the people in the GDR have endured in silence.

The fact that the East Germans have liberated themselves, even if the initial spark came from those who fled and a tail wind blew from the East and, to a lesser extent, from the West, also contributes towards the formation of an independent and proud self-esteem.

Those who have fought for freedom and unity in the West for decades certainly have no intention of crudely and clumsily telling those who have suffered a much harder fate what they should do.

Some people in the West who demand restraint have completely different plans. This explains the prohibitory tone.

Sometimes the impression is gained that it would be better if Germans were not allowed to even argue in favour of reunification.

Secondly, most of the recommendations made are anything but unwelcome. On the contrary, many East Germans turn to us for advice — from the general secretary of the SED to the previously unpolitical persons who are taking their first steps in the emerging Opposition groups.

Not to give advice in this situation would be tantamount to supporting the SED.

Thirdly, it is understandable that a people which has been exploited since 1946 and is in the process of liberating itself feels that other things are more important to begin with than speedy unifica-

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GERMANY

Finding a place in the making of history

This article, which discusses the challenge to international statesmanship posed by changes in central Europe, was written by Herbert Kremp, a former editor in chief of *Die Welt* and now one of the paper's executive editors. It appeared in *Welt am Sonntag*.

Five weeks have elapsed, at the time of writing, since the Berlin Wall came tumbling down. Five weeks in which more has happened than for years.

Helmut Kohl outlined his 10-point plan for Germany, since when the wheels of major international diplomacy have turned. History has been made, with the Germans in its midst.

What, the international community has since wondered, will the Germans do and what status do they demand in history? Viewed from different angles, 10 answers can be given.

1. When mention is made of a German confederation and of federation and Willy Brandt says a German Confederation must now be established, history seems to have turned full circle since 1815.

The German Confederation, set up at the Congress of Vienna, consisting of 37 principalities and four free cities under Austrian leadership, was the axis of what was the final [illegible] of mechanistic statesmanship, the system of European balance of power.

This work of art served the purpose of preserving the legitimate order from the revolutionary forces of constitutional and nation-state movements.

Germany was not united as it was after 1871, but it had quiet corners in which happiness prevailed; it had the Biedermeier movement in the arts — and it was trembling with unrest.

One cannot read Metternich's memoirs without feeling a sense of emotion. Even as Austrian Chancellor he well knew that his system would not survive in the face of the more powerful forces of the age.

2. A new German Confederation could emerge as a stroke of international diplomatic imagination aimed at emulating this mechanistic system of statesmanship.

Setting up fresh bulwarks against the forces of nations is a reputation the bellhops of world affairs seem to gain as they talk in terms of the Allies, of Helsinki 1, Helsinki 2, pact treaties and security systems.

All these regulatory factors serve a purpose, but nothing lasting has been ordained from above since the days of Metternich and Bismarck.

Populistic Kaiser Wilhelm and his Reich, the Versailles of Clemenceau and Poincaré, the Weimar of Ebert and Hindenburg and Hitler's Third Reich were all different and defied comparison in their values.

But a point they had in common was that forces came to the fore from below. Even when changes were proclaimed from above they reflected the popular will.

3. The system established after World War II can only be said to have been imposed from above inasmuch as one sees Stalin as its determining force.

A majority of the Allies held a different view of the future of Europe. Peoples themselves did so in any case, especially peoples who found themselves behind the Iron Curtain.

Rust has now eaten up the entire "system." How else could it have collapsed like a termites' nest a mere four years after the end of the Stalinist era (1923-85)?

International diplomacy today faces the most powerful demonstration of popular will from below encompassing the largest number of nations ever in a single year of European history.

Mechanistic statesmanship? Where is it to set about its task?

4. Europe, the peoples of Eastern Central Europe and, above all, the Germans have triggered a contradiction.

No-one seriously questions their right to self-determination. Yet military manpower and equipment face each other armed and ready for mutual destruction more than ever before in history.

The Soviet Union is heading for economic and social decline yet it would remain, until the nadir of its collapse, the most heavily-armed military power in the world.

In a situation such as this anyone who failed to understand the great powers' misgivings about uncontrolled outbreaks, about even problematic arrangements boiling over and about arbitrary and impromptu rewriting of borders can only be said to live in cloud cuckoo land and not in history past or present.

5. This aspect is the one in which we must consider our Western allies, who have responded with some apprehension to the confusing changes that have occurred in the past few weeks.

The fear of the Germans felt by latter-day Roman Giulio Andreotti may be viewed with the greatest equanimity.

Britain, however, instinctively senses that the realignment of Europe will end the era of a special relationship that has linked Britain and America since the days of Churchill and Roosevelt and assured Britain of a special role between the Atlantic and the Continent.

From this perspective change is hard to accept, especially as the European Community, as the future European re-

WELT am SONNTAG

gulatory force, and the powerful Germans will form a new centre of decision-making with no further role to be played by a British Army on the Rhine.

What, for that matter, about the French?

6. The French are literally a chapter unto themselves. Their reconciliation with the Germans was on the basis of a divided Germany.

This fundamental fact must be appreciated if one is to grasp the sense of shock felt by the *classe politique* in Paris at the change in the balance of power in Europe.

France is afraid of a free-standing Third German Republic, an economic colossus in a position to decide on its own who it chooses to side with.

"It is too soon for reunification," says President Mitterrand. France would prefer provisions and long-term arrangements.

What it wants is a European Community with the successor to Talleyrand at its epicentre, with an ECU rather than a deutschemark, and Paris or Brussels, not Berlin, as the turntable of Europe.

7. But this involves a contradiction not even Descartes would have been able to solve. Nations have an undisput-

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What reunification might mean

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tion. Nevertheless, despite 43 years of division and despite the current problems the desire for reunification in the GDR appears to be growing from day to day.

As opposed to the situation in Hungary or Poland this reflects a specific feature of the German division: We have no common national anthem and no common national colours.

The black-red-and-gold flag without the hammer-and-sickle emblem was also the flag of the GDR for many years, and the Hungarian example shows that the national colours also do not look bad with a hole where the Communist emblem used to be.

A perusal of *Neues Deutschland* is yet again extremely instructive in this respect.

Every day there are warnings against reunification and every silly remark made in the West on this point is quoted.

The SED, which hopes to pull through somehow in a separate GDR, knows that it will not be able to do so in the case of reunification.

Fourth, yet most importantly: *de facto* reunification is in full swing.

This is most obvious when a look is taken at the German-German border. Where do the people who can now travel freely go?

They do not travel over the sea to Sweden or over the Oder Neisse Line in the — still with this name — People's Republic of Poland or over the Erzgebirge to Czechoslovakia, but to Germany.

After all, one need only look at everything which is being done in West and East!

There are discussions about arrangements for economic assistance for the GDR under the condition that a transformation into a democratic state takes place, during a visit to East Berlin a Minister from Bonn demanded free elections in the presence of the head of state and Prime Minister, there is cooperation with Opposition groups, and there is an unimpeded participation of the West German electronic media in the domestic policy discussion in the GDR.

On the other side, we find the ideas articulated by the new GDR Prime Minister, Hans Modrow, on an intensive network of contractual relations with the Federal Republic of Germany.

His proposals go far beyond what is laid down in the Basic Treaty and are proposals which Bonn Chancellor Helmut Kohl can accept.

In other words, the Federal Republic of Germany and the GDR are moving towards each other at such a pace, the Federal Republic of Germany is involved to such an extent in the domestic policy of a GDR which is now only partly Communist, and the whole affair is such a dynamic process that the development can only be described as the beginning of reunification.

Verbal reservations cannot retard this process. The vortex is too powerful.

The Greens are the best example of this effect.

Although they did not bring down the Communist regime but ordinary, in the narrow sense of the word, apolitical people who fled at the earliest opportunity the system was also undermined by our alternative groups.

As opposed to the established West German parties the Greens had close links with the Opposition in the GDR for many years. For this reason the representatives of the Greens — as opposed, once again, to the representatives of other parties — were often refused entry into the GDR.

The style of demonstrations and of arguments in the GDR reflect the links with the Greens.

The Greens in the West and the Green-Alternative groups in the East are — together with the SED — among those most adamantly opposed to reunification because, scrounging on Stalinism, they hope to realise their ecosocialist ideas in the GDR.

Objectively, however, and against their will, they are encouraging the process of reunification.

In its concrete form this process is developing contrary to previous expectations, but this is only natural in history.

The economic relations and ties between the GDR and the Federal Republic of Germany will expand to such an extent that the famous leap from the quantity to the quality of an institutional unity will also take place.

Economic obstacles will be removed and an economic upswing will occur in the GDR on a par with that which took place in the West in 1948.

The technical side can be entrusted to industry itself. In its own interest it will not permit a "sell-out."

There will be freedom of the press and free elections in the GDR. The then freely elected People's Chamber and its government will then work together with the institutions of the Federal Republic of Germany to give a coherent shape to the growing together of the two parts of Germany.

This could take place via the formation of new *Länder* (states). There may also be a confederation, although this need not be the final step.

A solution will also be found to the problem of membership in the various alliance systems.

Those who try to prevent all this and, like the Greens, desperately try to set up two sovereign states are striving for a German "special way" of a divided nation in the midst of nation-states.

Such a special way would undoubtedly become the source of endless tension and risks.

The most difficult chapter with respect to the future of the GDR and its inner pacification, however, is the appraisal of the past.

It would be disastrous if, above and beyond the probable trials on charges of corruption, other criminal law steps were to be taken.

There is already something repulsive about the way in which the SED, in arch-Stalinist style, forces its former leading politicians to admit their guilt. SED members are being expelled from the party for doing nothing more than acting in conformity with the previous system.

Nevertheless, there is a fundamental sense of legal justice which requires that those who were responsible for political terror cannot be simply pensioned off. A happy medium must be found between pensioning off and revenge.

The many people who died; the torture of the state prisons; the broken backbones of more than an entire generation; the planned corruption of the children; the wasted lives of millions — is all this no more than a pardonable mistake which the perpetrators simply confess but which has no further-reaching consequences?

This, however, is also a subject which the GDR must discuss and resolve itself.

Just as there will be no sell-out of the GDR there will also be no *Anschluss* with the Federal Republic of Germany.

The Germans in the two territories will unite to form something new.

More prosperity and more practical experience in dealing with freedom will

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BUSINESS

A surge of entrepreneurial innovation rolls across the open borders

Whatever economic system East Germany eventually gets, the sheer weight of joint deals and cooperation plans being drawn up, hatched or acted upon in conjunction with West German firms is exerting enormous pressure in the direction of a free-market economy.

With free elections yet to come, East Germany has not yet decided which economic course it really intends to steer: a free-market economy as in the Federal Republic of Germany or a modified socialist system with market economy elements.

There is already a foretaste of the forces which could be aroused if the population and leadership of the GDR opt for a (social) market economy along western lines.

Daily news reports show what tremendous entrepreneurial imaginativeness is being developed in the West, what waves of ideas, recommendations and business plans are surging towards the GDR, how many people are already on their marks and ready to go, and how many people are employing their business expertise to consider what has to be done in the GDR and how they can become involved in reconstructing its economy.

The department store group Asko wants to develop the retail trade system in the GDR and improve the supply of goods.

The Dresdner Bank is opening an office in the city of the same name. A two-day phone-in advice campaign by the same bank met with such a widespread response from local firms that even the bank itself was surprised.

The Bertelsmann media group has opened a book club in Dresden. Volkswagen is to manufacture cars in East Germany. The leasing branch is gearing itself up for contracts with GDR industrial undertakings.

The Bayern-Hyp is assessing business opportunities in the East. The Peine-Salzgitter steelworks are negotiating a cooperation agreement to help modernise the GDR steel industry.

The Schindler lift construction factory is holding talks with the aim of granting licences, working together and setting up a joint venture.

The energy supply concern PreussenElektra is making preparations for the construction of joint power plants in the GDR.

The Ruhrgas AG had agreed on cooperation with the GDR people's combine "Schwarze Pumpe."

Japanese firms are showing interest in locations in Northeast Bavaria as a basis for the intensification of business contacts with the GDR.

A municipal industrial development organisation has started to turn the administrative district of Hersfeld-Rotenburg into an economic "East-West pivotal point."

The building societies want to help the GDR mobilise private funds for housing construction.

The brokers' association Ring Deutscher Makler has confirmed a growing interest in industrial floor space in areas bordering on the GDR.

The mechanical engineering industrialist Kurt A. Körber from Hamburg has set an example by giving Dresden heavy goods vehicles, equipment and paint to repair buildings.

The Dortmund Chamber of Industry and Commerce has recorded an increasing number of inquiries from member companies and provides an "Address Service" for those looking for business with GDR firms.

This are just a few example chosen at random which have hit the headlines. There are plenty more which have not been given the publicity. Entrepreneurs who have to assert themselves every day in the competition on their markets are full of new ideas.

Powers of imagination are being stimulated, plans are being devised and the entrepreneurial activity drive is spreading. It is becoming clear what energy can be released when there is a good chance that coming up with ideas will prove worthwhile.

It would be a waste if the GDR does not fully utilise these forces, forces which also exist in the GDR itself. Ordinary citizens would be the ones to suffer. New horses are needed to pull the GDR out of the mess. The old hacks cannot do the job.

The leadership of the GDR would only [illegible] turning their backs on the country and moving to the Federal Republic to try their luck.

There is a danger that the current willingness to invest greater effort will tail off if something does not happen soon. What the country needs is more market, not new experiments with Marx.

The nimble-minded businessmen in the West, of course, are not selfless. Profit is the drive.

This self-interest, however, embedded in the necessary legal framework, is definitely desired. If channelled properly everybody will benefit. The prosperity of large sections of the population in the West is proof enough.

Statements such as "We do not want to become a duplicate of the Federal Republic" make no sense as long as the GDR people really want the duplicate of prosperity, which in turn cannot be achieved without the duplicate of the market economy.

The free elections in May 1990 will show clearly enough whether the majority of the population really want socialism, no matter how reformed it may be. The rejection during recent weeks of any repeat of the socialist experiment suggest that it does not.

The fact that GDR citizens and the non-SED parties advocate German unity means that they are convinced that this is the only framework for economic prosperity.

In the meantime parties such as the East German CDU and Democratic Awakening have included the market economy in their party manifestos. They know why.

They do not want the GDR to become a field for experimentation with any form of socialism. Left-wing intellectuals have other ideas.

The people of the GDR, however, should not become guinea-pigs for the second time in their history.

Klaus Peter Krause

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 20 December 1989)

Managers from East polish up their expertise in West

The German Association of Independent Businessmen (ASU) has presented an eight-point list of proposals for economic cooperation with East Germany. Immediate steps include training East German managers, setting up a cooperation agency, and arranging sponsorships for specific projects.

Ten East German managers have already been allocated practical trainee places in ASU member firms, ASU chairman, Volker Geers, told the press.

Practical training begins in January. Geers appealed to all West German firms to take part in the campaign.

The ASU decided at short notice to hold this year's last presidium meeting in Dresden and invited economists, scientists and politicians such as the new deputy chairman of the SED and mayor of Dresden, Wolfgang Berghofer. The meeting met with a positive response.

The practical management training periods for GDR middle and executive management personnel are to last between six and eight weeks in a medium-sized West German firm of their choice.

The West German entrepreneurs will personally attend to the special instruction of expertise.

The main subjects will be management tasks, production know-how and marketing. Geers expects about half of the 7,000 ASU members to bear the costs of the trainee places themselves.

The establishment of a [illegible] exchange will pool information on possible cooperation projects and demands at all levels.

A special office will be set up in Dresden and a GDR contact man will be employed in the ASU secretariat in Bonn.

The exchange will begin with an information and contact market in Dresden attended by 30 West German businessmen.

With respect to the "business sponsorships" several ASU member firms will advise a medium-sized enterprise or GDR entrepreneur during regular visits to the GDR.

In addition, the ASU suggests that an innovation exchange should be set up with, to begin with, the Technical University in Dresden to utilise research findings, that two- to three-day management seminars be held for 20 participants from the GDR, that joint business colloquia be organised, a GDR/Federal Republic of Germany discussion circle set up to discuss comprhensive questions relating to cooperation and economic policy and ASU councils established for plants and combines in the GDR.

According to Geers the West German businessmen have no intention of acting as imperialists towards the GDR or in "charitable condescension."

They simply hope to offer their experience with the market economy to the GDR economy.

Private initiative and entrepreneurial management, which was suppressed and almost eliminated completely by the planned economy system, must be reactivated.

Geers emphasised that the main aim must be to stimulate the "inner potential of GDR workers and scientists."

He did admit that ASU immediate measures also have a non-altruistic background. This is the hope that the GDR

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EAST GERMAN ENERGY

Inefficiently produced and then squandered by consumers

East Germany's energy industry is inefficient and filthy. And the inefficiently produced energy is even less efficiently used by consumers. The winter is likely to produce a crisis. The articles on this page analyse the East German industry and outline how West German firms are planning to help out.

Energy productivity in the GDR — gross domestic product in relation to primary energy consumption — is very low, certainly in comparison with the West.

The overwhelming contribution made by domestic brown coal mined open-cast in the GDR imposes a heavy burden of environmental pollution.

In energy production and conversion, not to mention grid distribution, the GDR has substantial technological ground to make good.

The quality of fuel and power on offer is in some cases totally inadequate by Western standards.

Western experts and, to an increasing extent, their Eastern counterparts are agreed that fundamental adjustments will be needed in the short and medium term in the GDR's fuel and power industries.

They will be indispensable if supply bottlenecks and ecological imbalances with irreversible damage are to be avoided.

Heavy investment will be needed; we can only speculate at this stage on the volume that may be needed.

Facts and figures on fuel and power in the GDR are available to a strictly limited extent, GDR government agencies having largely stymied the compiling of valid statistics in the past.

The energy sector was felt to be a strategic one. On account of evaluation problems the quantitative information available virtually defies conversion into internationally comparable statistics of any value.

Energy productivity statistics, for instance, are little more than guesswork because the basis on which the GDR's domestic product is assessed differs from Western standards.

A 1987 survey arrives at the conclusion that, at least until the late 1970s, the GDR's specific energy consumption was over twice as high as the Federal Republic's.

This productivity gap seems sure to have widened markedly in the 1980s. In the Federal Republic, as opposed to the GDR, energy price rises led to at least partial harnessing of savings potential to achieve what, on average, were above-average efficiency growth rates.

Federal Environment Minister Klaus Töpfer recently noted that per capita energy consumption in the Federal Republic was 5.7 tonnes of hard coal equivalent, as opposed to 7.9 tonnes in the GDR, with its lower living standard.

In an internationally commissioned survey on The State of and Outlook for the Energy Industry in the GDR the Berlin DIW economic research institute arrived last September at conclusions that tally with what has already been said.

Roughly 25 per cent more energy per capita was estimated to be used in the GDR even though overall economic output there reaches only about 75 per cent of the level in the Federal Republic.

The GDR only made any appreciable headway in energy-saving between 1980 and 1983. To quote the DIW report: "By means of a number of administrative measures the so-called initial access reserves were merely exploited."

Modernisation of the GDR's fairly old plant and equipment was ruled out by strictly limited scope for investment and by the inertia of the system.

The 1987 survey works on the assumption that in 1983 the GDR's conventional power stations consumed 75 per cent more of their own power than comparable power stations in the Federal Republic at the time.

Grid power wastage in transport and distribution was nearly two thirds less than in the GDR. According to Bonn Environment Ministry estimates GDR power stations convert only 22 to 24 per cent of the energy in the coal they burn into electric power. The corresponding figure in the Federal Republic is 38 per cent.

Harry Maier, a GDR economist who migrated to the Federal Republic in 1986, estimates that between 30 and 50 per cent more energy is used in making industrial products made in the GDR than in making comparable products in the Federal Republic.

New regulatory criteria will certainly need to be laid down if use is to be made of the substantial energy-saving potential in the GDR. As the DIW report puts it:

"Overall specific energy consumption will remain fairly high unless fundamental changes are made to the economic system."

Intra-German joint ventures are an excellent opportunity of modernising the fuel and power industry in the GDR, but the necessary investment, running into billions of deutschemarks, is unlikely to be forthcoming until there is an adequate return on the risk run.

Extensions to links between the power grids in the two German states would be a step in the right direction, but they would have no more than a marginal effect on the level of inefficiency.

The GDR's primary energy balance sheet reads as follows (with corresponding figures for the Federal Republic in brackets):

In 1987 brown coal (lignite), with 68 (8) per cent, was by far the most important source of energy.

Then came petroleum, with 13 (42) per cent, natural gas, with 9 (17) per cent, hard coal (anthracite), with 5 (nearly 20) per cent, and atomic energy, with 3 (12) per cent.

Since the late 1970s the fuel and power role of brown coal in the GDR has increased perceptibly (from 62 per cent in 1979), at one stage topping 70 per cent.

The relative quantity of GDR power needs met by atomic energy has, in contrast, remained constant over the past 10 years.

Implementation of what, originally, were much more ambitious nuclear power targets has been hampered by plan cutbacks and delays.

Since Chernobyl an increasingly pessimistic view has gained currency on the GDR's erstwhile reliance on nuclear supplies from the Soviet Union.

Yet leading GDR energy experts still call for nuclear expansion as the only long-term alternative to fossil fuels as they increase in price and wreak increasing havoc on the environment.

Environmental pollution is a serious problem in the GDR on account of the above-average use of brown coal, accounting for 85 per cent of power station output, combined with its poor quality and the low efficiency in power production.

The GDR is rated the country with the highest level of environmental pollution in Europe. Coal-fired power stations in the Federal Republic have been equipped with sophisticated facilities to hive off sulphur dioxide and nitric oxides; the GDR was unable to afford this expense.

Besides, public awareness of environ-

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Outlook: a winter of discontent

Ruhrkohle AG, the Ruhr Coal Corporation, has joined the Hanover power utility PreussenElektra AG in offering the ailing GDR fuel and power industry emergency supplies should supplies present a problem in the GDR this winter.

PreussenElektra, a Veba subsidiary, has offered to supply electric power. Ruhrkohle has in mind the Federal Republic's national coal reserves, which could be made available to the GDR to offset supply shortages.

The GDR is running into increasingly serious difficulties in producing energy of its own and in importing energy supplies, mainly from East Bloc countries.

A severe winter could make these problems more serious virtually overnight, West German mining company experts feel.

The GDR is not only having trouble meeting its brown coal output target, set at an original 10-per-cent increase to 330 million tonnes a year but in reality running at a lower level than last year.

Imports of hard coal are also creating problems. Strikes in the Soviet Union, the GDR's main supplier, have rebounded on East Berlin, with quotas being reduced.

Energy reserves have become a scarce commodity in Poland and Czechoslovakia too, with exports to the GDR being cut back. These shortfalls could arguably be offset by supplies from the Federal Republic's coal reserves.

Stockpiles in the Federal Republic currently total 5.6 million tonnes. The cost is met by government-backed loans raised on the capital market.

Stockpiled coal is officially stated to be worth DM130 per tonne. It could be supplied to the GDR at this price or its nearest equivalent.

Mining officials suggest that part of the West German coal reserves be relocated in the German Democratic Republic. The GDR's energy consumption consists of 70 per cent coal, 18 per cent oil and eight per cent natural gas, plus a mere 2.5 per cent atomic energy.

Atomic energy plays a minor role in the power industry too, accounting for about 10 per cent of output. Brown coal-fired power stations account for 85 per cent.

Brown coal-fired power stations are inefficient and a major environmental offender, which is why hard coal is imported as an alternative.

In 1987 hard coal imports totalled roughly 7.2 million tonnes, mainly from the Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia.

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, Munich, 18 December 1989)

MOTORING

Trying to clean up the belching Trabant engine

DIE WELT

West Berlin's environmental affairs department and the GDR's Environment Ministry are joining forces to probe possibilities of detoxicating GDR car exhaust fumes.

Twenty East German two-stroke Trabants are to run for roughly a year with experimental changes to their engines and catalytic converters attached to their exhaust pipes.

This is the gist of an agreement that is now being drafted in detail in Berlin.

Agencies associated with the project are to include the GDR's central exhaust inspection establishment in Adlershof, East Berlin, and the department of automotive engineering at the Technical University, West Berlin.

Officials on both sides plan to finalise details in about a fortnight.

Staff at the Technical University have been at work for several weeks analysing the exhaust fumes of East German two-stroke car engines.

Little was known about them in the West because there were only a handful of Wartburgs and Trabants on West German roads.

The billowing blue and white exhaust and its unmistakable smell merely made it seem likely that it wasn't the cleanest of clean air.

The automotive engineering department's Professor Hermann Appel says this surmise has been borne out on the testbed.

East German two-stroke engines emit roughly nine times more hydrocarbons and five times more carbon dioxide than conventional Western four-stroke engines.

Four-stroke engines with exhaust pipes incorporating a catalytic converter emit roughly one per cent of this level.

Nitric oxides are the only exhaust toxin for which two-stroke engines perform markedly better than four-stroke engines. They have a lower compression ratio and use a richer mixture of fuel and air.

East German vehicle emission levels, which far exceed pollution ceilings in force throughout Western Europe, have been found to be due mainly to engine design features.

But low technical standards in engine parts and maintenance also contribute toward high pollution counts.

The typical billows of white smoke emitted by East German cars consist of partly-burnt two-stroke oil. Hydrocarbons and aromatic compounds (the unmistakable smell) are a result of poor combustion.

As mixture intake and exhaust systems are not entirely separate in two-stroke engines, some of the fuel mixture finds its way straight into the exhaust.

Even so, Professor Appel says, improvements can be made to the exhausts of roughly 2.2 million East German cars.

Tests in West Berlin have shown that regular, careful adjustment and replacement of a handful of parts should be enough to reduce emission by up to 30 per cent. Spark plugs are frequently covered in a thick layer of soot. Contacts are often dirty or worn out too, not to mention air filters and the outmoded ignition cables.

Regular emission checks would work wonders, Professor Appel says. At present they are strictly limited in the GDR.

Catalytic converters are to undergo trials as a further step in the direction of clean exhausts. They need to be run on an unleaded two-stroke mixture.


As two-stroke engines respond very sensitively to exhaust changes, catalytic converters will need to be carefully suited to the specific engine.

As the Trabant's engine has been manufactured for several decades and has undergone many changes, one converter model will not be enough.

Yet if the designers get their converter models right, about 80 per cent of the toxins should be extracted from East German car exhaust fumes.

Richard Schwalbe

(Die Welt, Bonn, 20 December 1989)



A cleaner future in prospect for these dirty little fellows. (Photo: AP)

Finding a place in history

Continued from page 6

ed right to self-determination, a right reaffirmed in this bicentenary year of the French Revolution.

"The Germans have the right to self-determination," says M. Mitterrand who, like General de Gaulle before him, would like to "end Yalta."

Yet that is a historic misunderstanding that has now, by a stroke of irony, come into its own. Yalta didn't seal the division of Europe. What the Allies agreed was to enable all liberated European countries to set up democratic institutions of their choice.

Stalin, not the West, broke the terms agreed at Yalta. The division of Europe was a later development.

Even so, anyone who wants to reunite divided Europe must endorse the right of self-determination for the Germans. He cannot do otherwise.

8. Our allies are well aware of this fact, with the remotest ally, Washington, most composedly aware of it.

Even left-wingers, inasmuch as they have not been infected by the Lafontaine virus, now appreciate the value of the Atlantic dimension.

Since President Bush and President Gorbachov exchanged views on Europe off Malta, views that have not yet been divulged to anyone, the importance of the United States in Europe has steadily increased.

Terms are gradually taking shape that will be of consequence for the process of German unification and may help to surmount in a cordial manner French thinking along Maginot lines.

It is a process that will take time. It relates to changes that are in progress and highly sensitive.

Nato and the Warsaw Pact are to stay, guaranteeing — as security agencies — the course of disarmament. Washington will come to terms with the European Community. Poland's border will be guaranteed by commitments more far-reaching than the Warsaw Treaty.

The CSCE process will assume the proportion of a security system for which the epithet "European" is too limited in scope, extending as it does from San Francisco to Vladivostok.

9. As for the Soviet Union, it is being handled like a fresh egg, not to say a whipped egg. Mr Gorbachov has set everything in motion, perestroika, glasnost, changes in Europe, including Germany, and he has got either his timing wrong or misjudged Russian inertia or the weight changes carry.

If he were to eliminate the power monopoly held by the Soviet Communist Party, Russia would fall apart like an over-ripe melon.

That is why Germany presents him with such serious problems. "The GDR is a strategy ally we aren't going to let drop," he has said, sounding a defensive note of defiance, not one of strength.

The Soviet Union is almost at the end of its tether, but the Russia that might follow it would be unpredictable.

Mr Gorbachov knows he will have to withdraw militarily behind the River Bug, which was why he laid claim, at the Malta summit, to a "legitimate interest" in a say in Europe's future.

10. Nato Foreign Ministers, meeting in Brussels, reached their own conclusions from the debate on Germany. They announced their intention of deploying yet again the methods of mechanistic statesmanship to keep popular unrest in check.

For the Germans that has both promising and less promising aspects. By the terms of the Nato communiqué they have a second-class right of self-determination.

If that is the case and the impetus of movement from below is not enough to sweep this aside, the Western alliance will forfeit its moral identity.

The new Europe cannot comprise zones in which two different sets of basic rights apply. What it will countenance are transitions — in keeping with the requirements of international political stability, controlled revolution and sound judgement.

Europe in the wake of the Cold War is, indeed, a tough nut to crack, as Max Weber once said. But 45 years of German inferiority are enough.

Herbert Kremp

(Welt am Sonntag, Hamburg, 17 December 1989)

EAST GERMANY AND THE ARTS

A sort of priest: inheriting a land after 40 years in the wilderness

In this article for the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, Sabine Brandt looks at the role of writers during the 40 years of authoritarian rule in East Germany.

On 4 November the writers Stefan Heym, Christa Wolf and Christoph Hein stood on the rostrum on East Berlin's Alexander Square and spoke to the crowd thronging at their feet.

People engaged in the cultural scene of the GDR had called for a demonstration for the freedom of the press, the freedom of speech and the freedom of assembly. About a million people turned up.

Stefan Heym, announced as the "nestor of our movement", told demonstrators that the GDR people had at long last learnt to walk upright after forty years of suppression.

The seventy-six-year-old was deeply moved and his voice quivered. The masses were equally moved by his words.

The old man in front of the microphone, with white strands of hair covering his venerably bald head, looked like the archetype of the popular leader in this hour between tears and triumph; ready to lead his people out of the misery he had shared with them for too long.

Like Moses on Mount Nebo he looked down on the Promised Land his people were about to inherit after forty years in the wilderness.

In all probability Stefan Heym did not let his thoughts drift that far into the realm of the legendary.

But the thought that he had always known that this day would come, that he had said so on so many occasions, and that he was at long last proved right must have passed through his mind.

For Heym and the colleagues at his side and elsewhere throughout the land the non-violent popular uprising was a victory, a political and personal confirmation.

Despite all the efforts of its censors the inflexible GDR regime had not been able to sever the contacts between writers and their readers.

Neither the reduction or rejection of publications nor administrative pressures were able to prevent writers from picking up signals from the population and giving them shape and expression in their books.

The people for its part developed finely tuned mental antennae to receive the messages of its creative intelligentsia. Dissemination via western media facilitated but was not a prerequisite for reception.

In the GDR before and during its democratic awakening an age-old dream of artists came true. Literature acted as a moral institution, as the herald of the speechless and the portent of the rulers-that-be; in other words, as a significant factor in social developments.

The euphoric moments which rewarded the writers in the revolutionary autumn of 1989, however, are fleeting. Like all earthly things.

Providing the government achieves the objectives envisioned by the millions of people in the GDR who have taken to the streets the GDR will be transformed — whether as an independent state or not — into a democratic affluent society. What will then happen to writers?

Moses saw the Promised Land in all its glory but never entered it himself.

Perhaps Stefan Heym will suffer the same fate. Experts expect the reconstruction of the GDR to take a very long time.

This, however, may spare Heym the experience that a democratic and affluent society makes completely different demands on literature.

Writers in the GDR are not used to being national showpieces or the subject of learned talk. They always viewed themselves in the role of quasi-priests, a role which in which they were confirmed by the regime. In fact, the regime imposed this role upon them.

Lenin and Stalin were well-aware of the fact that literature also means political influence.

Stalin's dictum that writers should be the "engineers of the human soul" not only sprang from tyrannical perfidy. The role assumed by Russian writers, for example, had long since fitted in with this definition.

Nevertheless, the Communist rulers broke with tradition by restricting the definition of the occupational profile of writers and robbing it of an essential dimension.

Their objective was clearly formulated already by the Bolshevist godfather Lenin in 1905, twenty-nine years before Stalin's adage:

"Literary activity must become part of the overall proletarian cause, a 'cog and screw' in the united and great social-democratic mechanism..."

This visionary meant that writers should be deprived of their creative



The hour between the tears and the triumph... Stefan Heym. (Photo: Sven Simon)

sovereignty and turned into instruments in the hand of the party.

The interaction between writers and the social forces within the population was blocked. All that remained was the pedagogical task of writers, who, controlled and censored by party officials, degenerated into multipliers of party slogans.

The Soviet regime exported this one-way-street relationship between creative artists and the general public to all countries it brought under its sway after 1945.

It is easy to imagine what effect the privileged treatment of conformist red carpet treatment by the Communist SED had on conformist writers.

It began with the Pajok system adopted from the Soviet Big Brother. This meant extra rations of semi-luxury foods and tobacco which ordinary Germans could only dream about in the early post-war years.

Flats and even houses were also allocated on a preferential treatment basis. The Writers' Association took care of incomes, insurance in case of illness and old-age pensions.

Holiday sites owned by the Writers' Association raised the status of writers loyal to the regime way above that of the average holidaymaker, who had to put their names on long production plant or trade union waiting lists to stand a chance of getting holiday accommodation.

In later years, when everyone had enough to eat, one of the big temptations was to belong to the "travel cadre" and enjoy the privilege of visiting countries ordinary working people in the GDR were at best familiar with from western TV.

All this was highly significant, but was outdone by the official esteem in which writers were held by the regime in all newspapers, speeches and cultural policy activities.

Writers lived with the feeling that they were the spice in the soup, an essential social factor.

The self-confidence this created was even envied by writers in the Federal Republic of Germany, who demanded a similar role in their own society. The role of a priests who preach the only true sociopolitical message.

Admittedly, those who yearned for priesthood would have unwillingly accepted the strings attached to this special role in society: absolute commitment to the Communist congregation and the use of instruments of power against all those who deviated from the official path.

Many well-known writers already left the GDR at the end of the 1940s and at the beginning of the 1950s after the first signs of this totalitarian development became clear, for example, Ricarda Huch, Theodor Plievier, Hermann Kasack and Rudolf Hagelstange.

In 1951 the first Prime Minister of the GDR, Otto Grotewohl, announced:

"Literature and the fine arts are subordinated to politics..., the idea of art must follow the route of march of the political struggle."

Today, hardly anyone is familiar with the titles of the countless books which praised the setting up of a socialist system in industry and in agriculture.

Books like these bored the GDR people to tears and prompted readers to a hitherto unknown extent to turn to classic authors.

The role of the writer inherited from Russia now lost the pedagogical dimension.

Writers first realised this on 17 June, 1953, and the only two literary reactions to the workers' revolt which can be taken seriously revealed what a shock it was for writers to realise how far away they had moved from the people.

In the October issue of the mouthpiece of the GDR Writers' Association, *Neue Deutsche Literatur*, 1954 Stephan Hermlin wrote his narrative *Die Kommandeuse*.

In this narrative he described the workers' uprising as the crazy dream of a concentration camp beast, which liberates the mob from imprisonment calling out "We need people like you!," while the noise of the demonstrations create hallucinations of masses shouting "Heil," swastika flags and SS uniforms.



Rediscovered frank language.. Christa Wolf.... (Photo: Poly-Press)

Stefan Heym wrote his novel *Der Tag X*, which was first published in 1974 by a West German publisher and after several alterations with the title *5 Tage im Juni* (Five Days in June).

Commenting on the book in 1970 Heym's friend Robert Havemann remarked:

"Stefan Heym should be grateful to the party that *Der Tag X* was never published.

"Heym adopts the utterly wrong official version according to which the '17 June' was a counterrevolutionary operation organised by western secret services."

The next shock for writers was in 1956 when Khrushchev criticised Stalin during the XX. Party Congress in Moscow.

In June workers in Posen (Poznan) and in October workers in Budapest took to the streets.

There was little time for a literary reactions, since the party already began in November to preclude the danger of a Petofi Circle in East Berlin and disciplined the restless writers.

This triggered a new exodus from the GDR, which lasted until the building of the Wall in 1961.

Among others Gerhard Zwerenz, Peter Jokostra, Manfred Gregor-Dellin, Christa Reinig, Heinar Kipphardt and Uwe Johnson left the country.

After this period the SED never regained complete control over the minds of writers.

The clearly audible signals from the people in 1953 and 1956 stayed in the minds of the literary world in the GDR. There were three ways of responding to the situation:

First, writers could ignore the people, side with the Communist rulers and make a career for themselves; Hermann Kant and Helmut Sakowski were just two of the writers who opted for this solution.

Second, writers could try to reform the regime through helping criticism and try to reconcile it with the people; this alternative was favoured *inter alios* by Christa Wolf, Erwin Strittmatter and Erik Neutsch.

Third, writers could discard the language of slavery and openly criticise what tormented them: Stefan Heym, Wolf Biermann and Monika Maron were among those who responded in this way.

Those who opted for the third alternative had the advantage of not being alone in the GDR with their anger.

Similar criticism had long since been voiced in other Communist states, even in the Soviet Union.

Didn't the novel which provided a completely different slogan come from Moscow: *Tauwetter* (The Thaw) by Ilya Ehrenburg? And what about Dudinzev, Siniavski, Daniel, Kopelev and, the most important writer in this group, Solzhenit-

Continued on page 11

THE ARTS

A restless humanity from an artist who fell victim to his own success

Hans Hartung was one of those artists who fell victim to his own success at the end of his career. Like Chagall and Kokoschka, Braque and Miró, he was unable to resist the temptation to become a decorative epigone of himself in his late work, which is as obliging as it is copious. That, in any event, is how he is viewed, particularly in Germany.

In France, where Hartung lived since the 1930s and just died, the assessment is more discriminating because the French are more familiar with his work; the late work included. Although the few pictures by Hartung bought by German museums are enough to warrant an unfavourable opinion, the approximately 30 large-format works selected with the greatest care and displayed in 1985 in Paris City Hall were sufficient proof that genuine pearls are to be found among Hartung's late work, too.


In "Malerei im zwanzigsten Jahrhundert" ("20th Century Painting"), which was published in 1954 and quickly became a cult book, Werner Haftmann described Hartung's painting as an existentialist drama: "...searching, becoming aroused, crossing out, asserting. The lines and bars provide our eyes with paths. If we follow these paths, everything becomes very eloquent handwriting in the flow of which tales of heated altercations are told: delays, frustrations, lattices in front of cheerfully glowing or menacing backgrounds. Into it is flung an energy that will not be denied — A restless humanity aroused beyond measure reins itself in with the utmost exertion by acting pictorially, thereby holding the source of fear in check. In happy moments, simple characters as concentrated as those in East Asian languages sometimes emerge."

This is how the painter became a hero answering the "picture's cries," facing the "field of origin of the waiting white surface," the "picture's drama," like an opponent. There is something of the pathos of Benn's late poetry in this interpretation.

The historical distance becomes even clearer when the paintings are viewed: We find them so decorative today that it is difficult to have an immediate feeling for the psychological drama behind their creation.

Hans Hartung, the son of a wealthy doctor, was born on 21 September 1904 in Leipzig. His childhood and youth were shaped and shielded by his educated middle class milieu: Long sojourns abroad were common, and it was only natural that 12-year-old Hans was allowed to pursue his interest in astronomy with a telescope and a camera. In Dresden, he passed his final examinations in a secondary school emphasising Greek and Latin. At Leipzig University, he was well grounded in philosophy and art history, studying painting and later painting technique at the art institutes in Leipzig and Dresden on the side. His painting was highly individualistic even when he was still a secondary school pupil. The persistence and sure instinct with which Hartung blazed his own trail to non-representational painting in the early 1920s seems no less amazing today. Even then he was basically employing what was to become his chief mode of expression: character-like figures in India ink.

A lecture by Kandinsky that Hartung attended at the age of 21 made it clear to him what it was he did not want: He quickly dropped his original intention to join the Bauhaus school. Over the following years



Driven from Germany by fear... the late Hans Hartung. (Photo: Catalogue)

he continued his studies, repeatedly interrupted by long trips abroad, in Munich and Paris. In 1928 he married the Norwegian painter Anna-Eva Bergman, one of his fellow students in Paris.

But then a period of disquiet began for Hartung. The darkening political situation in Germany began to cast a shadow upon the young artist. Profoundly depressed by the death of his father, whose forebodings about the rising Nazi regime he regarded as his legacy, Hartung left Germany and moved to the Balearic island of Menorca.

savings, and since remittances to "expatriate Germans" were now only allowed in small amounts, he was also deprived of the accustomed support of his family. On top of that, the island's inhabitants, noticeably contaminated by the international political atmosphere, suspected the foreign artists of being spies, prompting a humiliating questioning at police headquarters. Although they were able to have their deportation order annulled, the Hartungs were pelted with rotten tomatoes by the island's children when they left in the autumn of 1934.

What followed was the eeriest episode in Hans Hartung's life. Back in Germany, he noticed he was being constantly shadowed, was able to convince his lawyer-cousin of the same and, taking his advice, went to Gestapo headquarters in Berlin to clear up the apparent mistake. Instead, he was treated to several hours in a cell and a brutal interrogation before he was allowed to go. It was never learned why he, neither a Jew nor a Communist, had been trailed.

It was presumably because of his having visited Communist and Jewish friends from his university days while in Berlin soon after his return to Germany.

In his lovely autobiography ("Autoportrait," Paris 1976), Hartung described the fear that gripped him in Germany and finally drove him from his homeland. The critic Will Grohmann was able to procure a French visa through his Parisian colleague Christian Zervos, who happened to be in Berlin at the time. It was then that Hartung and his wife resolved never to have children out of fear they would not be able to offer them even "a minimum of security."

Beginning in the autumn of 1935, they lived in a small atelier in Montparnasse. It rained on the bed, and the toilet in the courtyard was used by everyone in the building. Living nearby were such artists as the Italian abstract painter Magnelli and the Dutchman Domela, a disciple of Mondrian. The American sculptor Calder often passed out invitations to presentations of his fanciful circus of wire figures. Even Kandinsky once paid a visit. Hartung told a delicious anecdote about a visit to Mondrian's tidy office, saying that after such oppressive puritanism he breathed a sigh of relief upon seeing a wall full of pin-up girls in Mondrian's bedroom.

Hartung was influenced most of all by the French painter Jean Hélion, who was still painting abstractly at the time, and by the Spanish sculptor Julio González. Har-

all because the gloomy style of spots and splashes matched his "profound pessimism about the future," and secondly because he lacked the money for large-format works and often for canvas as well. That is why he went into Café du Dôme more and more often, asked for stationery and ink, which was still a common practice then, and produced his drawings.

His precarious economic situation, quarrels with a mother-in-law who sought to spare her daughter the life of Germans in exile, and his wife's series of increasingly severe and probably psychosomatic illnesses, for which she ever more often sought treatment abroad, combined to lead to their divorce in 1938. It was more out of resignation than genuine conviction.

After the separation, Hartung was forced to live in Paris feeling like an illegal alien because the German embassy confiscated his passport. The first exhibitions of his painting were held, although commercial success continued to elude him. One of his oil paintings, created in 1936, was displayed at the extensive Exhibition of Twentieth Century Art in London two years later, which was a particular honour.

His meeting the young painter Roberta González, the sculptor's daughter, was a ray of sunshine in his private life. He married her in 1939. Hartung, who volunteered for duty in the French army shortly after the war broke out, was spared neither internment camp in France nor jail and concentration camp in Spain. He finally joined the French Foreign Legion. While serving as a medical orderly in Alsace toward the end of the war, he was severely wounded by a German shell and had to have his right leg amputated in a field hospital. During the late 1930s, his style of painting began to become more like that of the surrealist school's abstract wing. At that time, Hartung's snarl of lines still resembled Mirós' tense threads and spots more than anything. The graphically bundled crosshatchings that later became his trademark and were emulated by painters like Sonderborg as well as various sculptors had not yet appeared. They did not dominate his art until after the war.

The post-war years brought Hartung, who had suffered so many privations, his just rewards: He lived in an atelier house in Paris he had designed himself, was known and respected internationally and was reunited with his first wife, whom he encountered in 1952 and remarried on the spur of the moment. Until her death in July 1987, Anna-Eva Bergman was at his side working on her abstract pictures.

In its mature, almost classicistically sedate form, Hartung's art, which had been a kind of smuggled message in dark times, became a model for many. Fritz Winter and Willi Baumeister came from Germany to see him. Pierre Soulages produced similar paintings in Paris and the critics no longer hesitated to apply the humanitarian

new, non-geometric abstraction: They declared it to be an international language uniting peoples.

When this élan waned in the 1960s, Hans Hartung's art changed as well. He moved to the Côte d'Azur, where he built himself a large house with a spacious atelier building in a toned-down Mediterranean Bauhaus style. The motifs of his pictures became less graphic. It was no accident that Hartung then began methodically taking photographs. While the camera was given the task of seeking out linear patterns, a new adventure began on canvas. Diffuse clouds of colour now filled his best paintings, which grew ever larger. Canvases measuring almost three metres by two metres were no longer rare, effortlessly giving the impression of cosmic scope. With these pictures Hartung returned to his youth, when he dreamed of becoming an astronomer.

Wilfried Wiegand

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 11 December 1989)

Continued from page 10

syn? The authorities responded brutally to such criticism: persecution, suppression, expatriation, imprisonment or labour camp. In the end the GDR resorted to the same means.

Wolf Biermann's expatriation led to the greatest exodus of artists and writers the GDR had ever seen. Those who stayed behind were muzzled, taken to court or thrown out of their professional associations.

The writers who chose the second alternative, however, also experienced a fiasco. The regime, unwilling to be told or even well-meaningly advised what to do, already ostracised its critics in 1965.

Christa Wolf's publications since then reflect the effects this had on the members of this group. Her books are kept in a tone which is coloured by subliminal accusation and a latent criticism levelled at the Communist party to establish a common basis in the name of socialism.

She has only rediscovered her frank language in the eruptions of the East German autumn of 1989. She is also reputed to have left the SED.

Aberrations and confusion. Yet in all their activities the writers of the GDR have done justice to the task which a closed system demands of its artists. They were multipliers, not only in the interest of the regime but to a growing extent over the years in the interest of their fellow citizens.

This is their honour and, up until today, the justification of their existence.

The voices of the masses, however, are already louder than those of the writers. Their formulations may not be so cultivated, but they are at least as intelligent.

They are now speaking for themselves and no longer need writers to articulate their demands.

An era has passed, an important role is over — providing the peaceful revolutionaries are victorious.

And what will happen to the writers in the new era? Simply citizens whose profession it is to write books and who cannot expect a taxi-driver to read these books while he is waiting to pick up customers. He'll be reading a popular daily newspaper.

Sabine Brandt

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 16 December 1989)

THE ENVIRONMENT

A not-so-secret secret comes out: Leipzig's air is filthy

Since the beginning of November the *Leipziger Volkszeitung* has owned up to what used to be top secret: the level of atmospheric pollution, of dust and sulphur dioxide in the city's less than fresh air.

Alongside the daily arts programme the newspaper publishes the previous day's mean pollution level and the. peaks recorded in various parts of the city.

Leipzig was the first city in the GDR to declare a state of emergency, a Stage Two smog alarm, three weeks ago.

The use of private cars, including two-stroke Trabbis and Wartburgs, was banned. Power stations and district heating stations had to curtail production to reduce their static emission.

The Leipzig, Halle and Bitterfeld industrial region has long been known to suffer from the highest levels of atmospheric pollution in the GDR.

One major offender, a 3,000-megawatt brown coal-fired power station, has an annual output of 20,000 tonnes of dust, 200,000 tonnes of sulphur dioxide, two million tonnes of ash and 40 million tonnes of carbon dioxide, according to estimates published in *Erfurter Filterpapier*, a Church-backed ecological magazine.

Ecological groups, most of them working under the aegis of the Protestant Church, have drawn attention to the problem for years.

Officialdom has been under top-level instructions to ignore it, but the winds of change are now blowing at Leipzig's *Neues Rathaus*.

"The level of pollution tolerance in this city has now been reached," says Dieter Packmohr, city councillor in charge of environmental protection.

He says atmospheric pollution in and around Leipzig is 60 per cent due to domestic heating and to about 700 small furnaces.

That leaves 40 per cent for which industry is to blame, first and foremost coal-fired power stations and coal sulphuration plant, two of the largest of which, in nearby Espenhain and Böhlen, are reputed to be the worst pollution offenders in the GDR.

The 30 brown coal-fired furnaces at Espenhain emit up to 100 tonnes of hydrogen sulphide a day. For years local environmental protection groups have called for the closure of the outdated works, which manufacture sulphur, tar and paraffin for export.

The plant dates back to 1938 and was seriously damaged during the war. Technical standards are pre-war.

In the early 1970s the GDR Council of Ministers decided to reconstruct, in other words, modernise the furnaces. Six out of 30 have since been reconstructed, amounting in practice to little more than essential repairs.

Reconstruction was never intended to include filtration of static emission, and Espenhain is still working flat out. Councillor Packmohr says there is nothing he can do: "Espenhain is not my responsibility."

Several months ago he drew up a catalogue of measures for immediate action on energy supplies and atmospheric pollution on behalf of the city council and the Leipzig administrative region.

The paper, which was sent to the appropriate Ministry in East Berlin, called in particular for dust retention and desulphuration equipment at the Dimitroff and Ernst Thälmann power stations.

It also called for preparations to be undertaken to improve and enlarge the supply of natural gas to the city.

The chairman of the government commission is shortly due to visit Leipzig. "The city council knows exactly what it wants," Herr Packmohr says, "a much larger share of the environmental protection budget."

Atmospheric pollution is by no means the only environmental problem the city faces. Garbage disposal — about one million cubic metres of domestic and industrial waste a year — is another.

A newly-established environmental pep group, *Der Ökolöwe* (The Eco-Lion, the lion being Leipzig's heraldic animal), has declared a state of emergency on the garbage front.

The new organisation is a merger of environmental action groups affiliated to the *Kulturbund*, the Church, the Opposition and the newly-formed Green Party.

It declared the state of emergency in connection with the closure of a garbage tip at the end of November.

The tip, known as F 2/95 after the main road it adjoins, was officially closed, according to the *Leipziger Volkszeitung*, in view of the "catastrophic working and living conditions of the staff, who had to tip garbage in the dark into pits over 30 metres (100ft) deep."

Ökolöwe Peter Lintzel mentions another reason. For years domestic and special, i.e. hazardous waste have been dumped indiscriminately at the tip, which is a landfill of disused open-cast workings.

The problem, Herr Lintzel says, is that the bed of the tip is level with the ground water. A year ago a Church youth ecological group lodged a complaint with the regional administration.

The complaint included photographs of the tip showing tippers sinking into the sludge and various storage practices.

The answer referred to an unspecified survey which was said to have concluded that no immediate action was necessary.

There is no official tip for hazardous garbage in the Leipzig area. Industrial, construction and domestic waste are tipped in layers at the Seehausen and Liebertwolkwitz depots, the idea being that any toxic effect will be "diluted."

Herr Packmohr says their capacity will be enough to meet local needs until the turn of the century; environmentalists disagree.

Dumping hazardous waste on either of the tips is subject to special permission in writing and involves cumbersome bureaucratic procedures.

A further problem is the shortage of vehicles. Army trucks have been used to help handle the backlog, but there is still a waiting list.

Herr Packmohr may claim to handle all applications personally, but the *Ökowlöwe* group strongly suspects there is a flourishing "trade" in illegal dumping.

"Basically," Herr Lintzel says, "we don't really know what is dumped where." On the basis of information laboriously compiled, environmentalists feel there must be about 400 unlicensed garbage tips in the Leipzig area.

No-one can tell what they may contain, but sewage sludge, fat, oil, minerals, paint and dyestuff residues certainly pose a problem for the city's only official sewage purification plant.

As most works don't have purification facilities of their own, hazardous sewage and effluent are pumped straight into the main drains. In the past 15 years 150 million marks has been invested in biological purification in addition to mechanical purification at what is, in any case, an outdated installation.

The next five-year plan does not include a badly needed third stage, chemical purification.

The purification basins at Rosental sewage farm are simply too small. Heiko Kalies, a Leipzig University chemical student, spent his summer holidays working at the plant and says the system regularly broke down. Toxins in the effluent treated made the purification plant ineffective, and when the inflow exceeded a certain amount it was allowed to bypass the purification plant and rejoin the purified water.

Nana Brink

(Der Tagesspiegel, Berlin, 17 December 1989)

Bonn offers East Germans help for 17 clean-up projects

The Federal government has offered to contribute DM1bn toward the cost of 17 environmental projects planned or agreed in the GDR.

They would cost the GDR a much higher sum in East German marks, Federal Environment Minister Klaus Töpfer, CDU, told the Bundestag environment committee in Bonn.

An even more important point than financing the projects, he said, was to extend planning and implementation capacity in the other German state.

The main bottleneck arose in connection with measures to reduce atmospheric and water pollution, he said.

Bonn will contribute roughly DM350m toward the cost of six pilot projects agreed last July. Agreements are to be signed shortly in Bonn once the contracts have been awarded to West German firms.

The other 11 projects, including modernisation of desulphuration facilities at Espenhain brown coal processing plant, near Leipzig, are expected to cost Bonn a further DM600m.

The Berlin Senate has also suggested building a district heating power station in East Berlin, plus composting and water improvement projects.

The Bonn Environment Ministry will be submitting three new ideas to clean up the Elbe. Professor Töpfer outlined energy supply, nature conservation, waste disposal and three-cornered cooperation with the GDR and Czechoslovakia to protect the Elbe.

Questioned on project finances, he said compensation arrangements were feasible only in connection with precautionary measures.

Chemical firms in the Federal Republic might, for instance, carry out improvements to chemical plant in the GDR, thereby drastically reducing static emission — and do so rather than investing in West German plant that is a much less serious environmental hazard.

The Bundestag environment committee is to hold talks in the GDR next month with a view to further intensifying cooperation with the other German state.

(Die Welt, Bonn, 17 December 1989)

EDUCATION

Background of East Bloc refugees leaves them with built-in handicaps

Education is a way for East Bloc migrants to Germany to bridge the cultural gap. But their backgrounds usually mean they are ill-equipped for school and university courses in Germany. Michael Winteroll reports for *Der Tagesspiegel*.

The breath-taking speed of events with sensations the order of each and every day in East Germany has pushed other, less strident problems into the background. There have been 317,548 *Übersiedler* from East Germany this year; the topic of *Aussiedler*, refugees from other East Bloc countries, has been pushed somewhat to the sidelines even though, up until November, 340,000 of them had arrived from Poland, the Soviet Union, Rumania and Czechoslovakia.

Many are hoping to use courses of study as a means of integrating into German society. Precisely how many are intent on this is difficult to say: enrolment figures show total numbers and do not differentiate between Germans born here and those who have immigrated.

A conference on the theme has been held in Bonn, organised by the University of Bochum and the Otto Benecke Foundation, Bonn. The Bonn Ministry for Education and Science promoted the conference. The reports over the situation of ethnic Germans in other East Bloc countries were depressing. A report by the East European Institute, Munich, over living conditions for Germans in the Soviet Union, the reasons for their exit and their integration into Federal Republic Society was presented by the Institute's Peter Hilkens. Those who arrive here know no German, have a scanty knowledge — or even less — of the Federal Republic and, because of their origins in old-fashioned rural environments, are unable to relate to the social and political realities of their new land.

Friedrich Kuebart, of Bochum University, in his talk, was able to point to fundamental changes in the Soviet education system since Gorbachov came to power: "The catchwords today are democratisation, humanisation and individualisation." And although they were still ideas and not yet deciding the form of day-to-day education in the schools and universities, the rigid central controls from Moscow which used to govern the smallest details in the far-flung republics was today noticeably less influential and should soon disappear.

Delegates heard that, in Polish schools, there was a shortage of teachers and teaching material and educational concepts were ancient. In the universities, a rigid examination regimen existed. Ilse Renate Wompel, of Bochum University, reported for example that a history teacher had passed 93 oral or written examinations by the time he first stood in front of a class.

In socialist countries, the idea of a student learning alone by a process of reflection and deduction is dispensed with. Learning was purely a receptive process.

Migrants from Poland and the Soviet Union are not only alien in most senses but also dependent on help. Few have a knowledge of English, essential in degree courses; few have a basic knowledge of modern communications technology. Younger migrants must not only learn German, often from the very beginning, but fill in extremely quickly the so-called "socially connected" lacunae.

A task of German institutions might be to recognise with a minimum of red tape those qualifications gained in countries of origin. Those who know how ticklish the recognition of some qualifications are when students change from one German university to another see the outlook here with scepticism. The declaration by Edmund Pollaks, consultant to the Westdeutsche Rektorenkonferenz (university vice-chancellors' — presidents' in America — conference) that recognition of qualifications was a matter of "academic administration", generated only a little hope.

What, then, should happen? Hans-Georg Hiesserich, of the Otto Benecke Foundation, reported on differences between Polish *Aussiedler* students here and *Übersiedler* from East Germany.

Every individual observation by *Aussiedler* tended to be overlooked because of the massive increase in the number of East Germans arriving in this country. There was agreement: not only concepts about integration must be modernised: a promising example is in Berlin where the Otto Benecke Foundation had developed a network of special-purpose lecturers and welfare students had been set up in a pilot scheme.

It was essential for existing schemes to be rapidly extended in the coming months in order to stave off collapse. In Berlin, although the demand for student advisory centres is urgent, not one facility is fully staffed.

Michael Winteroll

(Der Tagesspiegel, Berlin, 14 December 1989)

Continued from page 7

economy will reach the same level of development as the economy of the Federal Republic of Germany.

In a sense, therefore, this initiative is an investment in a "market of the future."

The ASU realises, however, that a realisation of its proposals only makes sense if there is a fundamental renunciation of the planned economy in the GDR.

In a paper stating its position the organisation takes the view that the key to a short-term improvement of the supply situation and to the solution of economic problems lies in the introduction of private business and its free development.

The GDR must open itself to more private entrepreneurial engagement and capital from the Federal Republic of Germany. Geers does not support the idea of supplying the GDR with used machinery, since this would only delay a true modernisation of the economy.

"I don't want to turn the GDR into a second-hand shop," said Geers.

The ASU feels that economic assistance official West German economic assistance cannot contribute a great deal to this process. It is restricted to the improvement of the infrastructure.

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, Munich, 14 December 1989)

Qualifications of East German teachers queried

Hannoversche Allgemeine

Teachers from East Germany face big difficulties when they arrive in Lower Saxony. Many have no chance of getting a job in the foreseeable future. Grundschule (primary school) teachers' qualifications aren't even recognised, says Hans-Joachim Fichtner, press spokesman for the education ministry in Hanover.

The reason: training was not up to the standard in scientific subjects as in West Germany. In East Germany, primary school teachers did not need to pass the Abitur (university entrance examination).

Teachers from East Germany who had taught civics had no chance of employment here on other grounds. They had to begin to study again. Herr Fichtner says teachers in other fields such as history had to complete an additional course of study and pass a special examination.

Education Minister Horst Horrmann said: "In general, teacher training in East Germany is not recognised here." All East German teachers wanting to fulfil the Lower Saxon prerequisites for teaching had at least to do post-graduate training. The 18-month state examination could be completed in a shorter time in individual cases, said Fichtner.

He said the change from the head-on teaching style of East Germany to the less-authoritarian style of West Germany was achieved only with difficulty. He said that on average 10 East Germans have been applying for teaching jobs each day in Lower Saxony since the big wave of refugees began in September.

Two thirds were rejected on the grounds given. The others were allocated temporary teaching positions.

Those succeeding in passing state examinations had an advantage over their colleagues in the search for permanent positions: experience in teaching in East Germany is then regarded by the Hanover ministry as a plus when application is made.

In other *Länder* where a more liberal attitude to East German teachers is adopted, there have been protests from the teachers and scientists trade union on the grounds that unemployed West German teachers who have been applying in vain for years for positions are further disadvantaged.

In Lower Saxony itself, the number of unemployed teachers remains high. Fichtner says that about 7,000 teachers in the *Land* had applied for 419 positions in May at non-specialist schools.

So is it possible that rejected teachers might find work in East Germany. Minister Horrmann has his doubts but he doesn't want to rule out the possibility entirely.

Herr Horrmann is due to meet East German Education Minister Professor Hans-Heinz Emons in Hanover — and on ther agenda will be the question of an exchange project for teachers for a few weeks between Lower Saxony and East Germany.

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 19 December 1989)

TOURISM AND TRAVEL

Latest special offer: 14 days in Honecker's guest house

From Christmas, Germans in the political West will be able to travel to East Germany without visas and without paying 25 West marks a day (changed at the — ludicrous — rate of one-to-one for East marks). The new arrangements were agreed after talks between representatives of Bonn and East Berlin. Before the ink had dried on the agreement, the wheels of commerce were beginning to turn on both sides of the (disintegrating) border. Willi Bremkes reports on an emerging boom in tourism and travel for the *Frankfurter Rundschau*.

How about a holiday as a guest of Erich Honecker? Well, not quite, perhaps. But from March it will be possible to stay at a house on the shores of Lake Schwerin, in East Germany, that used to be Honecker's guesthouse, says Birgit Grosz, who works for Hansa Tourist, a travel agency which specialises in East Germany. She says the extent of the sudden opening up of travel possibilities in East Germany is mind-boggling.

A jetful of West German bigwigs from the travel industry has visited Leipzig. Lufthansa's chief executive, Heinz Ruhnau, personally organised the show. On the other side, the men from Interflug, from the East German travel agency and from Interhotel, under the leadership of the just-appointed East German Minister of Tourism, Professor Bruno Benthien, met with the men from the West — all the big names were represented: Lufthansa, Condor, Hapag Lloyd, the big operators and hotel chains. Out of the meeting, said one delegate, was enough to get German-German tourism on to its feet.

Although the new politicians in East Germany are still heavily involved with their own problems, which meant that some of the Westerners were not quite sure whom they should talk to, tourist industry people on both sides have become active. One well-known West German said that development of the tourist industry was the best way for the East German government to raise much-needed hard currency.

It is equally clear that the West German operators see big profits looming. West Germans are naturally curious about the changes in the East — and now that travelling there has suddenly become as easy as travelling to Holland or Austria. And so far the new wave of tourism from the East to the West is not organised. The tour operators on both sides want to change that.

There are also some clever tour managers in East Germany. Heinz Tischer is deputy general director responsible for foreign western business at the East German travel agency. He says: "In the past we have built up experience with our business partners in the West and have learned how to represent our own interests."

The level of self confidence attained by travel industry functionaries is indicated by Tischer's description of the situation they used to face in relations with travel industry officials in other East Bloc countries: "They sold us the ultimate rubbish in holidays at expensive prices and then treated our customers badly. They knew that we had no alternatives to offer."

This year, East Germans booked 1.2 million holidays in other East Bloc countries. By comparison, there were a mere 4,500 holidays booked through the agency in Western nations. That should now change. Tischer: "It is good that it will change. Now they (travel officials in other East Bloc countries) willfeel the competition." The new East Berlin Prime Minister, Hans Modrow, has mentioned a figure of 100,000 as the number of organised trips to the West that now should be possible for East Germans over the next year. Organising them will not be a simple hurdle for the East German travel agency.

Tischer: "The main problem is the lack of hard currency." It was hoped that solving this problem in such a way as to benefit as many East Germans as possible to whom the West used to be a forbidden area will be facilitated by energetic help from the travel industry in the Federal Republic of Germany.

Tischer said there had already been talks on specifics in Dresden with West German operators over joint deals in third countries. "Why should we begin from a position of zero?" It was better to profit from the experience and the purchasing power of Federal Republic operators.

Longer term, the East Germans hope to found a tour business jointly with several West German operators, which would mean that East Germany would have sales outlets in the Federal Republic. In addition, an East German tourist promotion agency is being planned for Frankfurt am Main, in West Germany.

Hansa Tourist, which is based in Hamburg, has declared itself prepared to organise tours for East Germans in West Germany, France and Italy. The costs would be met by a reciprocal deal under which trips by East Germans to West European countries would be funded from a fund of West marks paid to the East Germans for trips by Federal Republic citizens travelling to the German Democratic Republic. In any case, Hansa Tourist is certain that there will be more East German customers than the 30,000 who have travelled this year.

The offers for Westerners are likely to become even more varied. Apart from holidays in former functionaries' villas, there could be, for example, study trips in which people would meet representatives of New Forum or environmental or church organisations. Sports and leisure trips are likely to be popular — through soccer or handball clubs, skat (a card game) groups, allotment associations (Schrebergärten, or allotments, are pieces of land allotted to private people under public schemes for part-ti me cultivation. They became popular as a way of increasing vegetable and fruit cultivation in Europe in the immediate post-war years). All this is now possible, assured Frau Grosz.



Luther once stayed here. Soon everyone will be able to . . . Wartburg Castle. (Photo: AD)

Herr Tischer confirms that rapid expansion of facilities is taking place. He says there are about 30 expensive Interhotels, another 25 hotels belonging to his agency and a few other sources of accommodation. The main reason why only 230,000 West Germans and another 345,000 visitors from other Western nations visit East Germany each year was the lack of accommodation. Now Western firms were to be used in joint ventures to build new hotels. There were already enough interested parties, says Tischer. It was, after all, a lucrative investment. An an example, he said that finance for the construction of Interhotels had been repaid ahead of schedule.

In addition, he said it would be inevitable that holidaymakers from the West would be allocated private quarters through an agency which would be set up. It was a declared aim of the new East Berlin government to develop private trade in tourism. Everything was possible from private restaurants to private tour operators. The new economic freedom, which still needed to be anchored in legislation, would have important side effects, says Tischer. Local people would learn to see tourism as a new source of income instead of as something to be rejected because, up until now, it had been an area which they had had nothing to do with.

Until now, rest and recuperation holidays for West Germans in areas such as the Thuringian Forest (a wooded mountain range in the south of East Germany), the so-called Saxon Switzerland (part of the Eldsandsteingebirge, a low mountain range on both sides of the River Elbe in East Germany and Czechoslovakia) had been available only in a limited number. The East German part of the Harz, the mountain range in north Germany, had been reserved entirely for East Germans.

Now, says Herr Tischer, more West Germans could go to all these areas because so many East Germans were choosing to see something of the West instead. The decline of the old, privileged clique of party functionaries was broadening travel opportunities. Some areas had been completely off limits because they were reserved for senior officials. Now these areas, all first-class, would be open to all. There would be special hunting holidays. At one stroke, 31 top-class hunting areas had already been made available.

Tischer believes West Germans will want to spend holidays where former East German party bosses used to have their holidays.

The open border in Berlin is likely to turn the entire city once again into a cultural metropolis and thus serve as a magnet for tourists from all over the world. Future joint undertakings between both German states are certain to boost business travel and conferences. The bigger industrial exhibitions in West Berlin are likely to fill the hotels in the Eastern part of the city as well.

Andreas Kramer, commercial director of the East German airline, Interflug, says there is already hefty discussion taking place over turning Berlin again into a major international civil aviation centre. Next summer, Interflug will be flying West Berliners to destinations in the Mediterranean on behalf of large German tour operators. Herr Kramer says there are no limits to further cooperation with tour operators and airlines of the Federal Republic. Everything was possible, even the founding of a new airline in conjunction with Lufthansa. Lufthansa has now set up its own sales desk in the Merkur Hotel in Leipzig. In the foyer of the hotel's congress centre, flights can be booked and information about all Lufthansa flights can be collected.

Now Lufthansa and Interflug are jointly using full-page advertisements in the East Berlin party newspaper, *Neues Deutschland*, to publicise air travel within German borders. This marks the first time the newspaper has ever used commercial advertisements.

In one edition, both airlines make East Germans a special Christmas offer of flights from Leipzig to Düsseldorf, Frankfurt am Main (West Germany) and Munich, and also from Dresden to Hamburg, for (the ultra-cheap rate of) 150 marks.

The wish for more intensive cooperation in the tourist industry has never been so strong. Question from skeptics about how it is meant to be made possible so quickly are usually answered by another question: who had imagined that what has already happened in East Germany could have happened at all? There is hardly any argument any more.

Willi Bremkes

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 16 December 1989)

Continued from page 8

mental pollution has only recently come to the fore in the GDR.

Had the money invested in the Federal Republic been invested in the GDR instead, says Professor Töpfer, the ecological benefit would have been much greater.

So it is in the Federal Republic's own ecological interest to lend a helping hand with modernisation of power stations in the GDR.

A major GDR aim has long been to become self-supporting in fuel and power. Imports and exports were mainly from East Bloc countries. More coal might be imported from the West, where German mining corporations have a keen interest in joint projects.

Given the Soviet Union's oil production problems, the GDR may have to import more oil from the West. Opec regards Eastern Europe as a whole as a fast-growing sales market.

But as oil is traded internationally in US dollars, foreign exchange will need to be earned by greater economic efficiency, especially in the GDR. Economic growth comparable with the West's is unlikely unless changes aim at more market economics, especially in the energy sector.

Heinz J. Schürmann

(Handelsblatt, Düsseldorf, 11 December 1989)

HORIZONS

Monday is protest day on the streets of Leipzig

It was Monday October 9. Demonstrators were taking to the streets in Leipzig. The official East German militia was issued with live ammunition. Blood supplies were rushed to the city from all over the country. Leipzig was closer to civil war than anybody realised until later. Retreating demonstrators took sanctuary in the Gewandthaus, whose doors were thrown open by Kurt Masur, chief conductor of the orchestra which plays there. But it didn't come to bullets. The 70,000 who went on to the streets full of angst survived. The government they were protesting against, Erich Honecker's hated regime, didn't. Axel Vornbäumen reports on the Leipzig Connection for the *Frankfurter Rundschau*.

International coverage is poised on the roof of a small van, where a Korean cameraman is panning his spotlight across Karl-Marx-Platz in Leipzig.

The KBS outside broadcast team from Seoul are strategically located opposite the main post office, a few metres away from the Opera House.

For weeks this has been the marshalling point for the demonstrations that have symbolised, more than any others, the revolutionary change that has swept the GDR.

It is Monday evening and the Monday demonstration has come to assume a political significance all of its own.

But on this particular Monday the on-the-spot location is less of an advantage than it might have been on previous occasions.

The TV footage that is to be screened on the other side of the world will be much the same as the pictures taken by other camera crews.

On the previous Monday hundreds of different banners and placards had been flourished. This time people passed by silently, with nothing but candles, torches and lanterns in their hands.

An estimated 150,000 people turned out, with amazing discipline, in response to the joint appeal by Kurt Masur, chief conductor of the Gewandhaus Orchestra, and Friedrich Magirius, the city's senior Protestant minister, to dedicate this year's final demonstration to the memory of the victims of violence and intellectual oppression under Stalinist rule.

It was a silent conclusion to what had been a tumultuous autumn. Monday evening demonstrations are to be resumed on 8 January.

It almost seems as though the demonstrators, remembering the beginnings of their movement, are determined to regain their lost nimbus of heroism.

Shortly after 5p.m., for the first time in weeks, the city-centre Nicolai-Kirche is declared closed because it is full to overflowing.

This was the church where it all began, when after prayers for peace first hundreds, then thousands, and finally hundreds of thousands of people took to the streets.

There were so many of them that in the end the "power of the street" was greater than the power of the state.

During the prayers for peace Friedrich Magirius recalls the beginnings, when "young people in particular stood up most determinedly and often very much on their own" for what others were later, and very much more easily, able to advocate too.

He calls to mind 9 October, the Monday on which the SED's works militias were issued with live ammunition and orders to shoot at "counter-revolutionaries" if need be.

It was the day on which blood transfusions from all over the GDR were rushed to Leipzig and hospital beds were cleared, when Kurt Masur had the doors of the Gewandhaus opened to give retreating demonstrators shelter on Karl-Marx-Platz.



I shudder with horror at the thought of socialism, says the sign. (Photo: dpa)

There were 70,000 of them, mostly scared stiff as they took to the streets to demonstrate against Erich Honecker's SED regime, but enough to attract the glare of international publicity.

Yet international opinion never as much as suspected at the time how close Leipzig had been to civil war.

Those were Leipzig's glorious days, when a telephonist who had put calls through to Berlin left her work and implored friends and workmates not, whatever they did, to take children with them to that evening's demonstration.

That momentous day in October is mentioned yet again by Provost Günter Hanisch, who refers in his sermon to the course the protest movement has since taken in Leipzig.

"In the beginning," he says, "we were as one. Now tendencies are taking shape."

German unity, an issue that has so changed recent Monday demonstrations that many who took part in them from the outset had begun to stay at home, was another keynote of the sermon.

Recent newsreel footage from Leipzig has included flags featuring Germany in its 1937 borders. What, the provost asked, are our Polish neighbours to think when they see these pictures?

He takes a clear stand between the fronts: "The others may say 'No Fourth Reich!' but our history has consisted not just of Reichs; there was, for instance, the Weimar Republic."

Tumultuous applause echoes round the Nicolai-Kirche as Provost Hanisch quotes the October 1949 GDR constitution, since superseded, in which Germany is said to be an indivisible, democratic republic.

Nods of approval are seen in the pews as he takes up the point made by Federal President Richard von Weizsäcker in an interview with GDR TV in which he said Germany must grow together but there must be no overgrowth.

A bare handful of people in one corner of Karl-Marx-Platz are later seen and heard to be dissatisfied with this formula, refusing to abide by the Church's appeal for silence.

Their chants of *Deutschland einig Vaterland* (a line from the GDR's national anthem) are a far cry on this occasion from the overwhelming impression they created on previous Mondays.

Nothing is heard of them on the Ring, the four-kilometre (2.5-mile) boulevard that encircles the city centre.

Yet even though the demonstration is quiet enough to hear the bells of the five Leipzig churches in which prayers for peace were said, it isn't really the silent protest march that was intended.

The routine of experienced demonstrators intermingles with the pre-Christmas spirit suggested by the thousands and thousands of candles.

Many Leipzig people seem merely to be going through the motions, demonstrating as usual on Monday, but with a marked lack of enthusiasm. In places, the human chain that is supposed to encircle the Ring is broken before most of the demonstrators have passed by in the direction of the Neues Rathaus, which is where the demonstration is scheduled to end. Many demonstrators make use of a welcome opportunity of heading home early.

So they miss the counter-demonstration by about 100 members of Leipzig's "autonomous bloc," militant left-wingers.

They march through the city centre with whistles and horns, intending to be a counterweight to the "fascists." But there is no sign that the "fascists" are out in force. So the counter-demonstration seems a little pointless.

Undismayed, the "autonomous bloc" make do with cries of *Wir haben Durst* (We Are Thirsty) and *Freiheit für Grönland — nieder mit dem Packeis* (Freedom for Greenland — Down With the Pack-Ice) — and with inquisitive onlookers, some peering from behind drawn curtains.

The lack of orientation to which the "autonomous bloc" draws attention as it zigzags through the city centre is in striking contrast to the hundreds of thousands of people who have walked round the Ring as usual. Yet as the "bloc" nears the main railway station it breaks up in seconds and, as if to show that even militants are orderly, a no-longer-needed banner is shoved into a dustbin.

Not everything has changed in the GDR even though the many changes can no longer be grasped in detail. Hundreds of candles burn at the Runde Ecke, the former headquarters of the *Stasi*, or security police, now disbanded.

This gesture of protest has survived from the days when the security police looked on from behind dark glass windows as members of the Opposition struggled to stop the demonstrators from storming the building.

The candles burn down, leaving a carpet of wax on the steps and window sills. Only a few weeks ago security police staff emerged from the building shortly after a demonstrationand removed the traces of wax. The building is no longer used by the *Stasi*. Yet three hours after the silent protest march is over the wax has been scraped away again.

Axel Vornbäumen

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 20 December 1989)

Continued from page 6

come from the West; more earnestness, modesty and a vigilant feeling for the magnificence of civil rights and liberties which has long since become routine in the West will come from the East.

This new unification, which is not a takeover, is also provided for in the Basic Law.

Its clever authors not only wrote the preamble, but also added the sober fanfare of Article 146 at the end of the wording of the Basic Law:

"The Basic Law shall cease to be in force on the day on which the a constitution adopted by a free decision of the German people comes into force."

The Basic Law, therefore, views the Federal Republic of Germany as a provisional solution.

Isn't there already a touch of the transitory in today's political reality? More than at any time in the past I for my part already view myself as a German rather than just a West German.

The objective which now underlies the Deutschlandpolitik is that it will render itself superfluous.

The differences of opinion over whether there should be a united, democratic and peaceful Germany or whether there should be two Germanies, one of them in some way socialist, will continue for some time.

Those who support unity will have to voice their arguments to the other side, and these arguments will take place in both East and West. This dispute will also transgress zonal borders.

I advocate a united democratic Germany in a united democratic Europe. Which democrat could have any objection to this?

Wolfgang Schuller

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 16 December 1989)

Continued from page 2

by force of arms. Conditions in which the Central European revolution of 1989 took place have thus varied from country to country.

What they share are objectives such as democracy, popular control, separation of powers and a free market economy with strong social commitments.

These are principles to which Western Central Europe also lays claim. In future it will be taken more at its word and cannot afford to rest on its laurels of material superiority.

The new, free Eastern Central Europe will live in an open Europe marked by constant self-criticism and efforts to perfect a peaceful, just and socially progressive society.

The military blocs are all that remains of the system prearranged at the Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam conferences and fleshed out by deliberately opposing trends on either side of what, for a while, was an Iron Curtain.

Social and political change necessitates changes in the military blocs too. The Central European revolutions of 1989 have laid an irrevocable groundwork for this change.


Karl Grobe

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 27 December 1989)

Bad Ems
Nassau
Lahnstein
Holzhausen a.d.H.
Bad Schwalbach
Schlangenbad
Wiesbaden

Routes to tour in Germany


The Spa Route




German roads will get you there, say to spas and health resorts spread not all over the country but along a route easily travelled and scenically attractive. From Lahnstein, opposite Koblenz, the Spa Route runs along the wooded chain of hills that border the Rhine valley. Health cures in these resorts are particularly successful in dealing with rheumatism and gynaecological disorders and cardiac and circulatory complaints. Even if you haven't enough time to take a full course of treatment, you ought to take a look at a few pump rooms and sanatoriums. In Bad Ems you must not miss the historic inn known as the *Wirtshaus an der Lahn.* In Bad Schwalbach see for yourself the magnificent *Kursaal.* Take a walk round the Kurpark in Wiesbaden and see the city's casino. Elegant Wiesbaden dates back to the late 19th century Wilhelminian era.

Visit Germany and let the Spa Route be your guide.







1 Wiesbaden
2 Schlangenbad
3 Bad Ems
4 Bad Schwalbach

DZT DEUTSCHE ZENTRALE FÜR TOURISMUS E.V.
Beethovenstrasse 69, D-6000 Frankfurt/M.